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More atrocities in East Timor 
23 March 1997 will go down as yet another date to be commemorated because of an atrocity in East 
Timor. Scores were injured, many seriously, and four are reported to have died in and around Hotel 
Mahkota in the capital Dili. Earlier, the Pope called for 'a prompt and internationally acceptable 
solution to the question of East Timor'. 
Between 300 and 500 East Timorese youths and stu-
dents took to the streets early on 23 March, to make their 
way to Hotel Mahkota, hoping to meet Mr Jamsheed 
Marker, a Pakistani diplomat who was appointed earlier 
this year as the Special Representative of the new UN Sec-
retary-General, Kofi Annan. Marker was on a visit to East 
Timor to gather information in pr~paration for the post-
poned meeting of the foreign ministers of Portugal and In-
donesia, under UN auspices. 
While in Dili, Marker met several civil and military of-
ficials as well as Bishop Belo but a meeting at the Univer-
sity of East Timor did not take place. Disappointed, the 
students, who had prepared hundreds of pages of docu-
ments to hand over to Marker, decided to go to his hotel the 
next day. 
They managed to enter the hotel but no sooner had· they 
entered and asked at the reception to meet the UN envoy 
than armed security forces began to stab and beat the 
peaceful demonstrators. Shots were fired and tear-gas can-
isters thrown. Once the youths were inside, the doors were 
locked, preventing them from leaving. The security forces 
were intent on trapping them inside and creating mayhem. 
A woman named Dirce fell in the hotel lobby when tear 
gas was used and was subjected to sexual harassment as 
she lay on the floor. Two women,- Olga Quintao Amaral 
and Celina Pires da Costa who were among those arrested 
and taken to a detention centre were stripped naked there. 
Of the scores injured, eighteen had gunshot wounds. 
Others were injured by stabbing or by broken glass as they 
tried to make an exit through the windows. 
Meanwhile, troops surrounded the hotel outside where 
many more young people had gathered. Scores who man-
aged to escape from the hotel, covered in blo~d, took ~e:­
uge in nearby buildings, in Motael Church or m the chmc 
next door. Troops also gave chase. The streets of Dili ·were 
deserted for the rest of the day except for troops on patrol. 
A list of the victims compiled three days later names 18 
people wounded by gunshot, 34 less seriously wounded 
and 90 people reported missing. 
UN envoy expresses concern 
As these events were unfolding on a lower floor and 
outside the hotel, Jamsheed Marker remained in his room. 
In any case, the violent onslaught in the hotel made dia-
logue with the students out of the question. 
On the next day, speaking to journalists before his de-
parture from Dili, Jamsheed Marker said that he deeply 
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regretted the incident. 'I was very sorry for what happened. 
I asked the local police to settle the matter as soon as pos-
sible. In fact I learned in the morning that an incident 
would happen because they (the students) informed me. I 
saw it by myself. I deeply regret the incident and would 
like to express my sympathy with the victims.' [Radio Re-
publik Indonesia, Indonesian state radio, 24 March] 
Charged for 'showing hatred' 
Although the number of people arrested is known to 
have been around one hundred, the police only acknowl-
edged that they had arrested 48 of whom half were soon 
released. Twenty-four are to be charged with 'showing ha-
tred' for the Indonesian government. Scores of East 
Timorese have been charged and tried in the past few 
months following a series of incidents going back to 
Christmas Eve, when Bishop Belo returned home after re-
ceiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. 
Timorese students in Java meet UN envoy 
After the failed attempt to meet the UN envoy in Dili, 
East Timorese students in Java decided to take things into 
their own hands and meet him in Jakarta. On 25 March, 33 
students forced their way into the Austrian embassy and 
announced that they would remain there until UN envoy 
Jamsheed Marker agreed to meet them. They made it clear 
they were not seeking asylum and did not want to leave the 
country. 
Jamsheed Marker, the UN Special Envoy on East Timor meeting 
President Suharto. 
They made public a letter to the UN envoy. Signifi-
cantly the letter is signed by the leaders of the Y ogyakarta, 
Solo, Malang, Salatiga, Surabaya and Jember branches of 
the government-recognised organisation of East Timorese 
students, IMPETTU. It was a bold move indeed for people 
regarded by the authorities as 'reliable', to go record like 
this. 
The letter expresses frustration at Indonesia's inflexible 
attitude which has prevented UN-sponsored talks from 
solving the question of East Timor. It condemns the armed 
forces 'for the genocide, terror and intimidation in East 
Timor which is still going on until today'. After cal~ing f~r 
the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East T1mor, it 
urges the UN Secretary-General to devise a new format for 
the UN-sponsored talks on East Timor, enabling the par-
ticipation of the leaders of the East Timorese resistance. It 
calls for the release of Xanana Gusmao and all East 
Timorese political prisoners and condemns the ruthless 
assault by the Indonesian army against demonstrators in 
Dili on 23 March. 
The UN envoy agreed to meet three of the men and re-
ceived their letter as well as a number of documents. The 
meeting was arranged by the Austrian ambassador, Johann 
Demel. 
Before leaving the embassy on 27 March, Austrian 
diplomats obtained assurances from the Indonesian 
authorities that they would come to no harm. However as 
they left the embassy, there was a police van waiting for 
them. The police said their names would be checked and 
they would be held for questioning 'for a few hours' . As we 
go to press, their precise whereabouts are not known. 
Envoy meets Xanana Gusmao 
Before leaving Jakarta, the UN envoy held a meeting 
with jailed East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana 
Gusmao. The meeting took place somewhere in Jakarta, 
outside the prison where Xanana is being held. Marker 
would not reveal the contents of their discussion but later 
told a press conference that he hoped to come forward with 
a proposal which will give impetus to the ongoing dia-
logue. (The UN-sponsored talks planned for last December 
were postponed when Kofi Annan was appointed to take 
over as UN Secretary General.) Marker stressed that his 
purpose in visiting Indonesia and East Timor was to move 
towards a political solution. 'We don't intend to waste any 
time on this. It's just a matter of structuring the meetings,' 
he said, adding: 'We shall start the process fairly quickly.' 
[Reuter, 27 March] 
Earlier however, the UN envoy had been told by ~resi­
dent Suharto that 'East Timor's status as Indonesia's 27th 
province is non-negotiable'. This drew a comment .from 
Nobel laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, East Timor resistance 
leader abroad, that 'nothing else could be expected from the 
dictator in Jakarta .... This confirms my lack of optimism 
about any change being possible with Suharto in power'. 
[RDP Radio, Lisbon, 20 March] 
Bishop Belo: Abuses continue to worsen 
Speaking to a Portuguese radio station during Jamsheed 
Marker's visit . to Dili, Nobel laureate, Bishop Ximenes 
Belo said that Indonesia had given no signs of easing up on 
oppression. While stressing that the Nobel awards had 
brought the problem into focus internationally, 'there have 
never been so many arrests as at present'. In response to the 
wave of euphoria over the Nobel awards, the reaction from 
the military was to seek 'to counterbalance the joyfulness 
by stepping up the actions of the pro-government militias, 
the gardapaksi ('upholders of integration') who during the 
night roam the villages and search houses looking for 
young people connected with the underground network, as 
they call it, to arrest and intimidate them.... There have 
never been so many arrests as in the last week of December 
and then throughout January, especially here in Dili. But 
early in February was the worst of all.' [Radio Renasenca, 
22 March] 
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Meanwhile, the East Timor Human Rights Centre in 
Melbourne, in a report on the human rights situation during 
1996, said that during the 12-month period, there had been 
'24 suspected extra-judicial executions, most of which have 
not been investigated by the Indonesian authorities, and 
numerous reports of "disappearances"'. 'Almost every 
month in 1996, there was armed contact resulting in death 
and injury throughout the territory.' 
The Centre, whose chairman is Bishop Hilton Deakin, 
said: '1996 saw a high level of arbitrary arrests, with up to 
381 East Timorese people being arrested. Reports have 
continued that detainees are systematically subjected to 
torture and ill-treatment, and sentenced at trials which are 
unfair.' [AAP, 14 March] 
For the first time, the inhabitant\5 of Ambeno, also 
f\STTIMOR 
known as Oecussi, the enclave situated on the north 
coast of West Timor, have risen up in protest. The incident 
occurred on 22 February and was sparked off when a priest 
attending a halal bihalql gathering to mark the end of the 
Muslim Ramadhan fasting month was handed a box con-
taining leftovers. Seeing this, an East Timorese standing 
nearby spread the news of this insult which led to hundreds 
going out onto the streets and attacking the commercial 
sector which is controlled by migrants from Indonesia. The 
unrest in Pante Makasar, capital of Ambeno, continued for 
two days during which as many as six thousand Timorese 
attacked and burnt houses of migrants. $ 
Konis Santana condemns British Hawks deal 
For the first time ever, Kon is Santana, leader of the armed resistance in East Timor, appeared on 
television on the BBC's main evening journal. The interview was part of a twelve-minute exposure of 
the role of British arms exports in beefing up ABRl's internal security measures against its own 
people and against the people of East Timor. . 
Speaking to the BBC's Sue Lloyd-Roberts who visited 
East Timor in March for Newsnight, Konis Santana com-
mander of FALINTIL, the armed wing of the East 
Timorese resistance, who took over after the arrest of 
Xanana Gusmao, condemned the British sale of Hawks to 
Indonesia which commenced with the first deal for ~ight 
Hawkjets concluded in April 1978. 
The war in East Timar ll'ould have taken another 
course if the Indonesians had not received military support 
from abroad, including the Hawks that Great Britain of~ 
fered during the crucial period after the invasion. Hawks 
killed so many people [. .. ] that today whenever people 
hear the noise of the Hawks flying, they are scared and the 
authorities know they will not leave their homes. 
He said that the Indonesian air force no longer uses 
British jet fighters for bombing missions but for intimida-
tion. [The Independent, 27 March] It was in this role that 
they were spotted by the British journalist, Hugh 
O'Shaughnessy, while in Dili in November, 1995. 
Demonstration halted in Baucau 
Newsnight also filmed young East Timorese trying to 
unfurl pro-independent banners during the ceremony in 
Baucau on 19 March when the new bishop, Basilio do 
Nascimento was officially consecrated. As soon as· they 
started raising the banners, dozens of black-shirted men 
within the crowd grabbed the banners, scuffles broke out 
and the protesters were taken away. One poster in Tetum 
reads: Viva Amo Belo, Nobel Timar Nian which means: 
Long live Bishop Belo, winner of the Nobel for Timor. 
Indonesians also condemn UK arms sales 
The report, broadcast on Newsnight on 27 March, also 
included an interview of the sister and mother of one of the 
students killed in Ujung Pandang in April last year when 
British armoured vehicles crashed onto a university cam-
pus. The mother, Sahbahnur Tasnifaston, told Sue Lloyd-
Roberts that the soldiers responsible for her son's death 
had been given only three months in jail. 'Is that fair? In 
my opinion, Britain sells these vehicles to Indonesia in the 
belief they will be used in times of war. But this was not 
war. It was to scare the students. ' 
Students who took part in a demonstration forty days 
later in Bandung were also interviewed. The demonstration 
was broken up when Indonesian police, using water can-
non supplied by Britain, sprayed them with liquid. One of 
the students said: 'We wanted to show our solidarity with 
the students in Ujung Pandang. We held a peaceful demon-
stration but the police immediately ordered us to disperse. 
We don't believe western governments supply this equip-
ment deliberately to be used against the people. The Indo-
nesian government'probably tell them that it is needed for 
defensive purposes.· They said the liquid contained ammo-
nium which burnt their skins and dozens were injured. 
This impo11ant film further reinforces the evidence al-
ready compiled by TAPOL showing that UK-supplied 
equipment is being used in contravention of the criteria 
which are said to determine the sale of arms to Indonesia• 
--. \--~~if~:~ ' 
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Election spells trouble for New Order 
Unlike the past jive elections under Suharto's New Order which have worked to plan, giving the re-
gime the outcome it needed to renew its claim to legitimacy, this year's elections are not running 
smoothly. Cynicism about the much vaunted 'Festival of Democracy' is widespread and even without 
an organised boycott, many voters are likely to stay at home. To secure a 'success/ ul outcome', secu-
rity forces will be on high alert throughout the campaign. 
A joke doing the rounds in Jakarta says it all. An Eng-
lishman said to an Indonesian: 'In Britain, the results of 
our elections will be known within hours because we use 
computers.' The Indonesian replied: 'That's nothing. In 
Indonesia, even without computers, the results will be 
known before the voting starts.' 
The elections, held every five years under Suharto's 
New Order, have nothing to do with changing the govern-
ment, they have everything to do with giving the regime a 
renewed claim to legitimacy. Everything is regulated to 
ensure that the government party, GOLKAR, will score a 
seventy per cent victory. Under a system devised in the 
early 1970s by Suharto himself, only three parties are per-
mitted to contest. The two 'also-rans' are the POI, the Indo-
nesian Democracy Party, and the PPP, the United Devel-
opment Party. Enjoying massive financial and logistical 
backing of local and national government as well as the 
army, GOLKAR has always been able to steamroller voters 
into voting for the government ticket. But Suharto was 
cunning enough to realise that a three-party system would 
give his system a democratic facade. Hence the creation of 
two other parties, after parties which survived the 1965 
onslaught were forced to merge. 
The two smaller parties are required by law to adhere to 
the State ideology, Pancasi/a, and to refrain from engaging 
in political activity at the lower levels of society, while 
GOLKAR whose members include the entire civil service 
has a dominating presence throughout the country. All the 
country's six million civil servants are required to join 
KORPRI, which is affiliated to GOLKAR, and to vote for 
it, along with their families. 
GOLKAR's built-in majority in the DPR's 425 con-
tested seats is reinforced by 75 seats allotted to the armed 
forces. As for the upper house which elects the president 
and establishes the guidelines for state policy for the com-
ing five years, five hundred seats go to presidential ap-
pointees from the regions and the other five hundred to the 
DPR. 
The security approach 
Acutely aware of nation-wide dissatisfaction about the 
elections, Suharto and the armed forces have made it clear 
that the police and troops, backed by tanks and armoured 
vehicles of all descriptions are being mobilised to keep the 
streets clear of 'trouble-makers'. 
In late February, Suharto declared that anyone. who 
tried to unseat him 'unconstitutionally' would be 'clob-
bered'. [Repub/ika, 1 March] Two days earlier, the armed 
forces commander-in-chief, General Feisal Tanjung said 
that during the election campaign, troops would be under 
orders to 'shoot on sight' anyone who 'violates the law'. 
After Suharo's 'clobber' threat, Feisal Tandung said that the 
armed forces would not 'compromise with anyone, espe-
cially those wishing to thwart the 1997 general election and 
the 1998 session of the MPR .... ABRI is not prepared to 
play high stakes with the nation's integrity and stability 
merely in order to tolerate unreasonable concepts and 
measures'. [Suara Pembaruan, 28 February and Kompas, 
2 March.] 
Unconstitutional ? Clobber ! 
2% Laba refers to a Suharto decree for a 2% additional tax. 
On 20 February, the army staged a show of force in-
volving ten thousand troops and a range of heavy equip-
ment, includin.g British-supplied Scorpion tanks, to cover 
the capital city during the election. This 'second line of de-
fence' involves troops from all the crack units within the 
armed forces. [Repub/ika, 21 February] 
Growing support for a boycott 
The removal of Megawati Sukamoputri as chairperson 
of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (POI), at the instigation 
of the government and the armed forces, is the event above 
all else that has alienated millions of voters. The rising tide 
of protest against Soerjadi, the regime's chosen figure to 
lead the rump POI, has led to widespread discussion at all 
levels of society about how to register this anger on polling 
day. Some s~y that
1 
thi~ should
1 
take. the form go/put _ 
go/ongan putih - or white group, which means invalidat-
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ing voting slips by piercing none or all the party emblems; 
others suggest that voters should simply stay away. An-
other possibility is that groups may try to disrupt the ·eJec-
~ion; Megawati supporters might decide to turn up at poll-
mg booths en masse to protest against the exclusion of their 
candidates. 
But calls for an out-and-out boycott have gathered pace. 
Groups organised by the Partai Demokrasi Rakyat (PRD), 
many of whose leaders are now in jail and on trial for sub-
version, have organised a boycott campaign, pasting up 
posters and distributing leaflets in a number of cities. Sev-
eral activists have been arrested and will soon face charges. -
The recently-established Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PUDl), whose leader, the former MP Sri-Bintang Pa-
mungkas was arrested in early March, has also called for a 
boycott of the election. Indeed that was the immediate rea-
son for his arrest. [See separate item.] 
Lending weight to the idea is a statement issued in Feb-
ruary by Cardinal Julius Darmaatmadja, SJ, as head of the 
Catholic Bishops Conference, telling Catholics that .'it is 
not a sin not to vote'. 
Will a boycott work? 
Opinions differ over the chances of a boycott having a 
major impact on the turnout. No one doubts that people 
living in villages will be under strong pressure to vote, both 
from local officials and the army. However, when a youth 
group organised an opinion poll among young people in 
Malang, East Java, they came up with the surprising result 
that more than 92 per cent said they would not vote . The 
poll which involved mostly well-educated 'trend-setting' 
young people also revealed that nearly half of those saying 
they would not vote were the children of government offi-
cials or members of the armed forces, indicating that young 
people are less likely these days to follow the advice of 
their parents. 
Two parties, the PRD and PUDI, have publicly called 
for a boycott and PRD activists have been out on the 
streets, leafleting. On 3 March, people in eleven major 
cities throughout the country woke to find walls covered 
with slogans reading: 'Without Megawati, boycott the 1997 
elections' and 'Until the dual function is abandoned, boy-
cott the 1997 election.' This is a high-risk strategy and sev-
eral activists have already been arrested while others have 
gone into hiding. Four young people in Central Java are 
POLITICS 
now on trial for pasting up stickers in Purwokerto, advo-
cating support for Golput. They have been charged under 
Article 161 of the Criminal Code for inciting others to 
'commit a crime' and face a penalty of up to four years. In 
fact, it is not a crime urider Indonesian law not to vote. In 
Bogor, West Java, several printing machines used to print 
pro-boycott leaflets were confiscated and the security 
forces said that they were hunting down those responsible. 
[Jakarta Post, 7 March] 
In Central Java, two students have been given one-year 
sentences for distributing leaflets which said: 'Protect the 
elections from cheating'. Altogether four students have 
been arrested for the same offence. All four are being held 
at a prison in Ambarawa. A large crowd of students staged 
an unsuccessful attempt to rescue them as they were being 
driven back to prison. [Bernas, 5 March] 
Although Megawati herself has yet to issue a statement 
on the PDl's position, PD! supporter~ have been rallying in 
large numbers in many towns and cities. In courts through-
out the country, local pro-Megawati activists have chal-
lenged the Soeryadi leadership and sought to have local 
PDI candidates disqualified . As PRD activist, Wilson, has 
written from his prison cell (he is now on trial for subver-
sion), even without instructions from Megawati who as yet 
is confining herself to challenges in the courts, the mem-
bers of her PD!, through extra-parliamentary actions, are 
siding with the boycott. 
Rigging the system 
Even though the real PDI has been excluded from the 
contest, the government is very apprehensive about what 
will happen . In countries like Nigeria, Burma, Serbia and 
Algeria, election results have simply been annulled because 
they went the wrong way for the rulers. Suharto has been 
smart enough make sure he always gets the right result. 
Arguably, fifty per cent for GOLKAR would be enough to 
control the DPR, still more the MPR, but that doesn't con-
vey the message Suharto craves. In a display of the New 
Order's lack of confidence in its own future, the regime has 
gone to extraordinary lengths, introducing a string of new 
rules which ensure far greater control than ever before: 
* All candidates for each of the three parties have been 
subjected to screening by military intelligence. This is 
nothing new. Candidates will need a Surat Keterangan 
Tidak Terlibat or 'non-involvement certificate'. This no 
longer only means non-involvement in the G30S/PKI (the 
events of 1965 and the communist party, the PKI). Other 
factors too have been taken into account such as 'loyalty to 
the Pancasila' and the past performance of prospective can-
didates who have served in previous national and regional 
parliaments. In December, it was announced that the elec-
tion committee had rejected 130 PPP candidates, 106 POI 
candidates and 21 GOLKAR candidates. This means that 
257 candidates, more than ten per cent of the total of 2,293 
candidates, failed the screening test. 
* No street rallies, demonstrations or street parades will 
be permitted. This decision was taken at the behest of 
President Suharto who said that 'shows of force' (as long as 
they're not by the army!) should be avoided. In past elec-
tions, public rallies were pretty much the only chance the 
smaller parties had to test their popularity. It was usually 
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the PDI which could bring out the largest crowds, espe-
cially before they were banned from displaying photos of 
Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, whose name is still 
hugely popular, especially among the younger generation. 
• A zoning system has been introduced. The country will 
be divided into six zones. On each of the 27 days during 
which campaigning is allowed, each of the parties will only 
be allowed to campaign in two designated zones so that 
only one party will campaign in any zone at any time. 
When an area is designated for one party, the other contest-
ants will be required to remove all their election posters 
from the streets. The PPP has strongly objected to this rule 
because its key speakers will have to travel huge distances 
from one day to the next day, involving costly air fares. 
GOLKAR will not face this problem as all provincial gov-
ernors and officials are members and will be able to ad-
dress election meetings in their zone. It also means that the 
parties are only allowed nine campaigning days instead of 
the 27 stipulated by law. 
* All election campaign meetings will require police per-
mission and the police will have the authority to halt an 
election meeting should 'violations' occur. Minister of the 
Interior (ret'd general) Y ogie S. Memed, said these viola-
tions might be 'administrative, political or criminal'. In ad-
dition, the only campaigning materials allowed will be the 
party's political programme based on the state ideology, 
Pancasila, with a clear commitment to 'national develop-
ment'. Moreover, meetings and events may only take place 
between 9am and 6pm. 
* Public meetings may only be held in smaller towns and 
municipalities, at locations determined by the district chief 
and the local police. The local police must be given seven 
days' notice of all campaign plans and meetings which may 
only go ahead after obtaining identification papers for the 
persons in charge. Campaigners may not criticise members 
of the government and must stick to development issues 
and comments of a 'constructive' nature. 
• The police must be given seven days' notice of all ve-
hicles, along with registration numbers, to be used to trans-
port supporters to any campaign events. The smaller parties 
see this as totally unworkable as they have no way of 
knowing in advance how people will travel to their meet-
ings. 
* Regulations regarding the use of radio and television 
during the campaign have been drawn up by the Informa-
tion Minister Harmoko - who is also chairman of GOL-
KAR. All th~ scripts for broadcasts on radio and TV will 
have to be examined and approved in advance by govern-
ment election officials. In addition, only RRI and TVRI, 
the officially-run radio and TV stations, will be permitted 
to broadcast election programmes. These programmes will 
be beamed from the centre, which may then be re-
broadcast by local stations. This blatant censorship of cam-
paigning material is perhaps the ultimate proof of how 
fraudulent Indonesia's elections are. 
The 'war of colours' in Central Java 
With the Soeryadi-led PDI trying desperately to with-
stand the onslaught of pro-Megawati groups hounding its 
local leaders in all parts of the country, it has fallen to the 
PPP to wage a rearguard action against the election rules 
that discriminate so blatantly against the smaller parties. In 
Solo and elsewhere in Central Java, local PPP branches 
have decided to boycott the election campaign, though not 
yet, it seems, the election because the rules are so disad-
vantageous. To boycott the election itself would put it on a 
collision course with the regime. 
PPP activists in Solo and many other towns in Central 
Java have however been waging a 'war of colours' with 
local government officials who ordered all walls, fences, 
monuments, public facilities and even trees to be painted 
yellow, because it is 'the traditional local colour'. In fact, 
yellow is the colour of GOLKAR. In a gesture of defiance, 
PPP activists decided to repaint everything a neutral white. 
The district ·Chief then alleged that such repainting was 'il-
legal' without government approval. But this has not halted 
the battle. Joining the 'war of colours' local pro-Megawati 
supporters have re-painting everything red and white, the 
colours of the Indonesian flag. 
A local academic, Andrik Purwasito, sees the conflict as 
a symptom of GOLKAR's declining popularity. 'In the vil-
lages, there are warnings that GOLKAR will have a diffi-
cult time dominating this election.' [Sydney Morning Her-
ald, 19 March] 
This local spat has provoked much comment in the na-
tional press and has served to highlight dissatisfaction at 
the way local officials use their position to promote the 
government party. 
Monitoring the election 
It was the establishment of KIPP, the Independent 
Monitoring Committee, in March last year that drew atten-
tion to the need for monitoring. As things stand, monitoring 
at every stage of the elections is the monopoly of the gov-
ernment's Election Implementation Board. Even the con-
testants play no role which in fact leaves the two small 
parties out in the cold because all officials are members of 
GOLKAR. Even supervision of vote-counting is in gov-
ernment hands. 
The emergence of KIPP, chaired by former TEMPO 
editor Goenawan Mohamad, with lawyer Mulyana W. 
Kusumah as secretary, prompted many other groups to set 
up monitoring groups. The fact that there are 300,000 
polling booths renders the task formidable for groups with 
very limited resources. 
Once Megawati had been ousted as chair of the PDI as 
a result of regime machinations, KIPP went on record say-
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ing that the elections should not go ahead until the POI 
question had been resolved. 'It was important for us to 
warn the government about this but we haven't the force to 
prevent the elections from taking place,' Goenawan told a 
press conference. He said KIPP volunteers would monitor 
the final stages of the election in eight cities: Pematang 
Siantar, Palembang, Bandarlampung, (all in Sumatra), Ja-
karta, Cianjur, Semarang and Malang (all in Java) and 
Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi). Besides the monitoring, 
KIPP hopes the general public would profit from the exer-
cise by gaining a better understanding of the political proc-
ess. [Republika, 17 March] 
Having had the issue of monitoring forced onto the 
agenda, the government has now said that it would invite 
foreign observers to monitor the eve~ts. However, it is be-
ing highly selective and only intends to invite officials 
from a few neighbouring governments like Singapore and 
Malaysia. However, foreigners 'will not be allowed to in-
continued from page 17 
of soldiers in full battle dress are once again part of the 
daily scene. 
The security forces justify their heightened vigilance 
because of a series of spectacular bank robberies in January 
and February, in particular a daring attack on the Lh0kse-
umawe branch of Bank Central Asia. A bank security 
guard and a cashier were killed and three soldiers were hit 
in a volley of bullets. The bank robbers got away with Rp 
405 million. The authorities claim that the robbery was 
carried out by GAM members and a hunt for the robbers 
has been mounted by combined military units, including 
more than a hundred paratroopers of Linud JOO/PS, the 
army's air-borne unit. 
According to Amnesty International [ASA 21/14/97] 
some of the people detained may have been arrested in 
connection with an alleged attempt to sabotage a gas pipe 
near Lhokseumawe. 
A GAM comeback? 
Major General Sedaryanto is hinting that there is a re-
surgence of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka activity. The confis-
cated firearms would appear to point in this direction, ac-
cording to the military commander. 
Aceh was the battleground of fierce combat between 
the Indonesian army and the GAM armed resistance from 
1989 till 1993. It peaked in late 1990 and early 1991 when 
ABRI forces brutally applied its 'low intensity conflict' 
strategy by killing thousands of innocent villagers, includ-
ing children and the elderly. Aceh was also the scene of 
political killings, disappearances and arrests. At least 50 
people have been convicted and given heavy prison sen-
tences. Thousands of Acehnese villagers were forced to 
flee to neighbouring Malaysia and it is a public secret that 
many GAM activists also moved across the Malacca Straits 
to prevent further killings of innocent Acehnese by the 
army. [Difficulties faced by Acehnese refugees in Malaysia 
were reported in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 139, February 
1997.] 
The gruesome methods applied in those years have left 
thousands of people scarred by the unexplained loss of 
close relatives and has intensified Acehnese anger towards 
POLITICS 
vestigate or pass judgment ' as this would be regarded as 
'meddling' . Officially invited observers would be given 
facilities but not foreigners who come on their own initia-
tive. [Jakarta Post, 15 March] 
Army chief-of-staff General Hartono has made it clear 
that his men will arr~st foreign observers who make any 
attempt to 'intervene' in the process. He warned people not 
to come to Indonesia as tourists and then start observing 
the elections. 'It's okay for people to observe things but 
they should not try to inject concepts from abroad which 
differ from ours.' The armed forces were part of the elec-
tion supervisory mechanism, he said, and would take action 
on the spot against anyone straying from the rules. [Jawa 
Pas, 19 March] * 
the Indonesian armed forces. The Aceh-Sumatra National 
Liberation Front based in Sweden recently submitted a 
statement to the 53rd session of the Human Rights Com-
mission in Geneva referring to dozens of mass graves in 
different parts of Aceh. While refusing to reveal the where-
abouts of these graves, they demanded that an independent 
inquiry be set up and stressed the necessity of establishing 
an international tribunal in The Hague for the arraignment 
of those responsible for the killings in Aceh between 1989 
and 1995. 
The Indonesian authorities are· now claiming that the 
situation is 'back to normal', but even if this is true, such 
relative 'peace and order' can disintegrate at any time be-
cause of the massive injustices and crimes against human-
ity perpetrated against the Acehnese. While in some parts 
of Indonesia, the security forces adopt 'carrot and stick' 
tactics, in regions like Aceh they only apply the stick. 
Another twenty-year sentence 
On 13 February the district court in Kisaran sentenced 
Iswarnaidi alias Agam, 27 years, to twenty years' impris-
onment for smuggling 5,000 bullets into Indonesia from 
neighbouring Malaysia. He and a friend named Mochtar 
succeeded in getting the goods through the Tanjung Balai 
harbour, but unluckily for them, they were caught in a rou-
tine traffic-police control check-up on the Trans Sumatra 
highway on the way to Aceh. In a shoot out Mochtar man-
aged t.o escape. According to news reports, Agam joined 
GAM m 1989 and fled to Malaysia in 1994. This is the first 
political trial to be conducted in Aceh for several years. 
The wave of trials in 1991 against alleged members of 
GAM res~lted in many heavy sentences. In the capital 
Banda Aceh alone, 12 people are still serving their sen-
tences: Adnan Beuransyah (9 years), Hasbi Abdullah (17 
years), Nurdin AR (13 years), Imran Hasan (7 years), Mul-
kan Usman (14 years), Ridwan !bas (8 years), Idris Ach-
mad (11 years), lbnu Hasan (15 years), Azis Bakini (10 
years), M. yacob (11 years?, Jamaluddin Usman (16 years) 
and TM Said (IO years). It ts feared that with the new wave 
of arrests, many more trials will follow. 
• 
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Tough security measures the order of the day 
With unrest erupting in many parts of the country, the Indonesian armed forces have had to devise a 
new strategy to cope with its restive population. But the armed forces are also under instructions 
from Suharto, in the run-up to the elections on 29 May, to 'clobber' anyone using 'unconstitutional' 
means. The only way the armed forces can ensure that the elections are -'successful' is to mobilise its 
forces massively to prevent protests, boycott actions and possible anti-election street actions. 
On 20 February, there was a huge show of force in Ja-
karta by a nu~ber of army units and ten thousand troops to 
make preparations for security in the capital and its envi-
rons during campaigning and on polling day. ABRI (armed 
forces) commander-in-chief General Feisal inspected the 
troops an~ _the rang~ of military equipment on display in-
cluded Bnttsh-supphed Scorpion tanks, armoured vehicles 
anti-riot personnel carries, hundreds of trail vehicles and 
helicopters. [Republika, 21 February] Similar shows of 
forces are also reported to have taken place in other parts of 
the country. 
But the forthcoming elections are not the only event 
threatening 'law and order' and the stability which Suharto 
so craves. Apart from the major eruptions of unrest that 
have exploded in West Kalimantan, Situbondo, Tasikma-
laya and Rengasdengklok, riots and clashes have been oc-
curring in many other places on a smaller scale. This has 
made it incumbent on ABRI to prepare for a new kind of 
warfare pitting itself against the whole of civil society. 
From the bush to the cities 
The military commander of East Timor Colonel Ma-
hidin Simbolon has called the strategy HGAT for ham-
batan, gangguan, ancaman & tantangan, or obstructions, 
disorder, threats and challenges. Coming from him, it re-
flects the present situation in East Timor where the most 
serious threat is from unrest in urban areas. But Simbolon's 
words clearly have a much broader application. 
Dealing with urban unrest is now at the top of ABRI's 
agenda and it has become clear that the red-beret special 
troops in Kopassus are not enough on their own to handle 
the situation. Kopassus commander-general, Major-
General Prabowo Subianto said recently his forces were 
ready to conduct operations with other units to deal with 
unrest. [Kompas, 27 February] 
It is argued that fighting guerrillas in the bush is much 
less complex as anybody in the bush can be regarded as the 
enemy. In the cities, adversaries are more difficult to iden-
tify. Moreover, shooting at random as happened in the Dili 
massacre in November 1991, which was a public relations 
disaster for the regime because it led to public outrage at 
home and abroad, has to be avoided as all costs. However, 
although on Java, troops have tried not to resort to fire-
power, it is another matter in West Kalimantan where 
troops have been involved in several grave atrocities 
(see separate item). 
Until recently, only Kopassus, the notorious red berets 
commando outfit and two divisions of Kostrad, the reserve 
troops, were looked upon to deal with widespread unrest. 
The two infantry divisions of Kostrad has a full comple-
ment of tanks, field artillery, air-defence units plus consid-
erable sea and air power. These rapid -deployment forces 
can be sent to any comer of the archipelago at 24 hours 
notice. On 10 March, army units were involved in exer-
cises in the capital to test their ability to zoom in on an area 
without delay, including bringing troops in by helicopter. 
Kopassus has developed a special anti-terror squad, 
previously called Detasemen 81 but nowadays known as 
Grup5/Anti Teror. The present Kopassus commander, Su-
harto's son-in-law Major General Prabowo, served in the 
anti-terror squad in the seventies. Prabowo typifies the 
modem Indonesian soldier: well trained, well educated and 
equipped with modem technology. He has encouraged the 
establishment of more anti-riot brigades and has stated in 
public that the military budget should be increased. 
Posko, the vigilance command posts, were set up after the urban 
unrest in many places. Many political analysts believe that sections 
in the army were involved in fanning the disturbances. 
Besides these units, the air force has also set up an anti-
terror unit called Paskhas TNl-AU Bravo, the police has a 
special anti-terror task force called Satuan Gegana and the 
Jakarta military command has a special unit called Tim 
Saber (Sapu Bersih, Clean Sweep Team). In other words, 
all arms of the armed forces are being mobilised to take 
part in ABRl's central task of dealing with internal disor-
der. All are equipped with modem equipment and anti-riot 
vehicles. [Tempo Interaktif, 15 March] 
The massive order for more than 350 armoured vehicles 
from the UK (see separate item on the Judicial Review) is 
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clearly intended to provide the equipment for the new 
ABRI strategy. 
District level command posts 
In the wake of the incidents in Tasikmalaya and Ren-
gasdengklok, Suharto ordered the establishment of so-
called 'vigilance command posts' at the kodim level, the 
army commands located in the 460 districts into which the 
country in divided. These posko are intended to be the eyes 
and ears of the army, coopting informal leaders who are 
expected to tell the army of potential trouble-makers, so as 
to halt unrest in its tracks. The army's chief of general staff, 
Lt-General Tarub recently told his troops: 'We are living in 
conditions of uncertainty which obliges us to be more 
vigilant'. 
Some commentators believe that Suharto took this deci-
sion to cut through the disarray that has occurred within the 
army because of the discord between officers and the lack 
of a reliable and effective line of command. After the 27 
July attack on the PDI headquarters, Suharto replaced more 
MILITARY 
than I 00 senior officers who were punished for not want-
ing to support the vicious attack. 
It also means that, like almost everything else, political 
command and co-ordina,tion is now firmly in the president's 
hands. It remains to be seen whether this new line of com-
mand will prove to be effective. [Rocky Gerung in Tiras, 6 
March] 
State of emergency 
Another weapon in the strategy is to provide ABRI with 
new powers in a law being promoted by the gruff-spoken 
ABRI chief of staff of social and political affairs, Lt. Gen-
eral Syarwan Hamid. By further formalising the special 
powers already exercised by the armed forces, the new law, 
UU Keselamatan Negara or 'national safety law', would 
place the country in a permanent state of emergency, re-
viving the dreaded SOB of Dutch colonial days. * 
Growing dilem01as for ABRI 
The fat years for ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, from 1965 till the mid eighties, are long since 
over. ABRI is now experiencing lean years and its fortunes are still declining. Weak leadership, a 
lack of new ideas and a below-average crop of senior officers sums up its present state. Indonesian 
society is changing rapidly but its fore most institution, ABRI, is proving incapable of meeting the 
challenge. 
ABRI's present leadership, yes-men like command~r-in­
chief General Feisal Tandjung and army chief-of-staff 
General Hartono, reflect the present crisis within ABRI. 
They excel in one thing only, loyalty to President Suharto 
(or his family). They are models of mediocrity, their press 
statements are an insult to the intelligence while ABRl's 
standing in society is in steady decline. 
The LIPI report: Dwifungsi contested 
Criticism of the all-embracing role of ABRI in society 
has usually come from the pro-democracy movement and 
NGOs. But reflecting the present zeitgeist, criticism has 
now come from LIP!, the Indonesian Academy of Sci-
ences. This prestigious institution received a tall order from 
President Suharto in February 1995 when he asked it to 
conduct a study of the social and political role of ABRI, a 
nice way to describe dwifungsi, the dual role of ABRI, as a 
defence force and as a social and political force. Two years 
later LIP! presented their findings to the public in a semi-
nar. They had interviewed the top brass of ABRI including 
retired officers like Soemitro, Sayidiman and Hasnan 
Habib. In every province, UPI scientists interviewed up to 
twenty people from all walks of life, including villagers. 
LIPI's recommendations are quite shattering. The aca-
demics concluded that ABRI should reduce its role in soci-
ety, in practical politics, social organisations and parties. 
By 2007 ABRI should no longer have representatives in 
parliament and only a limited presence in the MPR, the 
People's Congress. ABRI's role in government should also 
be rolled back and limited to the regions. 
The report caused quite a stir among the ABRI top 
brass. Even more liberal-minded retired generals like z. A. 
Maulani and Hasnan Habib were stunned. The dwifungsi is 
a sacred cow and treated as such by all but a few brave 
souls in the pro-democracy movement. LIPl's report is an-
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other sign that Indonesian society is changing fast. Many 
Indonesians who work as professionals in the bureaucracy 
and the private sector have their own bitter experiences 
dealing with military and their insatiable demands for uang 
pelicin, or bribes. Dwifungsi is often called dwiporsi, or 
double portion. 
A look back at history 
The golden days of the dwifungsi began after the mili-
tary takeover in October 1965. While Sukarno was nomi-
nally president until 1967, Suharto and his generals virtu-
ally took control of the country. As the red drive took its 
gruesome toll in late 1965, many positions in the admini-
stration, from cabinet posts ,to village heads, fell vacant 
because of the killings and imprisonment. Overnight, thou-
sands of military officers became village heads, district 
heads or governors. 
In fact, dwifungsi began with General Nasution, the 
eminence grise of ABRI. In November 1958, a period of 
turmoil, Nasution formulated the idea of ABRl's double 
role as a military and a social and political force. He 
probably never expected it to go to the extremes it assumed 
in less than a decade. In the first Orde Baru cabinet in 
March 1966, twelve of the 27 ministers were from ABRI as 
well as more than half the secretaries-general of govern-
ment departments . Twelve of the 26 provincial governors 
were military men. In the 1973 cabinet, there were 13 
military ministers. Only four governors were civilians and 
about four hundred army officers filled the top strata of the 
bureaucracy. The seats in Parliament allocated to the armed 
forces were increased to l 00 in 1985, 20 per cent o.f the 
total, twenty per cent of the total. In those days, the stan-
dard joke was follows : 
A father asked his three sons what they wanted to be. 
One said he wanted to be a doctor, another said he wanted 
to be a lawyer, but the third said he wanted to join ABRI so 
that he could be anything from the president down. 
The military also had a major share in the economy. In 
the forefront was Lt-General Ibnu Sutowo who for many 
years was president-director of Pertamina, the state oil 
company. Many officers were 'dropped' into state compa-
nies often with disastrous results. Companies were used to 
siphon assets into local commands or private coffers. 
From 1950 till 1957, when democratic institutions held 
sway, the military remained in the barracks but in I 957 
President Sukarno, under Nasution's influence, established 
the Dewan Nasional (National Council) which led to the 
obliteration of existing political institutions. Top soldiers 
like Nasution became members of this unelected body. 
These changes ushered in the period known as 'guided de-
mocracy' but often called 'disguised dictatorship'. This was 
when ABRI gradually assumed a commanding position 
with the help of the 1945 Constitution, which confers vir-
tually absolute powers on the executive. When Suharto 
took over the presidency he retained the guided democracy 
institutions and such 'achievements' as the anti-subversion 
law and the corporatist structure. 
ABRI's dual function is now enshrined in several laws. 
In 1982 a law on defence and security was adopted reiter-
ating ABRI's two functions and in 1988 a second law fur-
ther enhanced ABRI's social-political role. 
Eroding the dwifungsi 
Although ABRI grew fat during the golden days of the 
dwifungsi, it was Suharto who hit the jackpot. He was 
perched at the top of the pyramid and never allowed the 
Orde Baru regime to become a military junta. In fact, by 
1980 it was more accurate to describe the Indonesian re-
gime as the Suharto regime. He and his sons, daughters, 
grandchildren and in-laws have been the main beneficiaries 
of the dwifungsi and have emerged as one of the richest 
families in the world. 
Suharto's increasing importance as the leading political 
and economic force inevitably led to a decline in ABRI's 
fortunes. The birth of- mighty conglomerates in the mid 
eighties, in one of the booming tiger economies of Asia, 
left ABRI on the sidelines. While few military benefited 
from the spectacular growth, it was the Suharto family and 
their cronies who reaped the harvest. 
Suharto and his loyalist ARRI top brass 
Similarly in the political institutions and the bureauc-
racy, ABRI's seats in parliament fell to 75 in 1993. The 
military in Suharto's present cabinet have become a small 
minority and the number of governors from ABRI is in 
decline. This is partly because more well-educated civilians 
are filling posts in the bureaucracy, but it is also because it 
is in Suharto's own interests to keep the army weak. 
The Orde Baru system destroyed all existing political 
institutions, leaving ABRI as the only political force. In the 
seventies, the ABRI leadership made strenuous but futile 
attempts to challenge Suharto's leadership. In 1985, Su-
harto introduced drastic changes by imposing five draco-
nian political laws which placed political life in a legal 
straitjacket. 
When General Benny Murdani became ABRI com-
mander-in-chief in 1983, he was given the job of carrying 
out a total overhaul. The territorial commands were 
trimmed down and the combat capacity of ABRI was 
greatly enhanced. It soon became clear that ABRI's social 
and political thrust was being reduced while ABRl's tasks 
as a fighting force were being brought to the fore. 
ABRI's territorial commands are a shadow government 
beside the civilian administration down to village level. 
Territorial commanders often behave like regional war-
lords, as Suharto did when he commanded the Diponegoro 
Central Java division in the mid fifties. It is crucial for an 
officer to develop a strong power base and enter into the 
heart of national and regional politics. But in the new 
st~ucture ther~ are t~n ten:itorial commands as compared 
with 27 provinces, mcludmg the illegally occupied East 
10 TAPOL Bulletin No. 140, April 1997 
Timor, making it structurally more difficult for territorial 
commands to control the civilian administration. 
ABRI's social-political decline went even further fri the 
nineties when two Javanese sayings were popularised. Ing 
ngarso sung tulodo means that ABRI should be in the van-
guard while tut wuri handayani assigns ABRI to a back 
seat. Today's top generals like Feisal Tandjung and Har-
tono are firm back-seaters and accept directives from 
President Suharto as absolute commands. 
ABRI as a fighting force 
Military analysts usually describe ABRI as a fusion of 
KNIL a~d PETA. KNIL was the Dutch colonial army 
whose pnme duty was to suppress domestic dissent. KNIL 
was useless as an army and collapsed within days when the 
Japanese attack~d the archipelago. PETA was the auxiliary 
force set up durmg the Japanese occupation. Practically all 
the generals who came to power in 1965, including Su-
h~r:o, wer~ ~ET A. veterans. They had received rigorous 
m11Itary trammg, with a heavy dose of militarism a combi-~ation of Japanese bushido and the Javanese ksa;rya tradi-
tion. 
ABRI's traditi~n.as fighting force is a pitiful one. They 
were capable of k11lmg hundreds of thousands of innocent 
and defenceless peasants in 1965 and 1966. But in the face 
of determined guerrillas in East Timar, West Papua and 
Aceh. the structural weaknesses of ABRI as a fighting 
force have shown through. 
Indonesia was relatively stable up to mid-1994, not be-
cause of ABRI's capacities as a fighting force but rather 
because of its extrajudicial institutions like Kopkamtib, 
, ___ ---------· 
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A new strategy from Jakarta? 
All these events have drawn a flurry of activity from the 
Indonesian government which was clearly worried about 
what they saw as 'a public relations exercise by Jose Ra-
mos-Horta and his friends'. Dino Patti Djalal from the In-
donesian embassy in London was one of Horta's main 
challengers. Jakarta also sent three Timorese: Clementino 
do Amaral, member of the National Commission of Human 
Rights, Domingus Polycarpo, marketing director of the 
Regional Development Bank in Dili, and Francisco da 
Silva, a businessman,"'to argue their case and heckle speak-
ers at the seminars. Other Timorese who joined in included 
Joao Mota, the foster son of Major General Prabowo and 
Tito Batista who works for the Indonesian mission at the 
UN in New York. 
Earlier this year, the Indonesian embassies in Wash-
ington and Ottawa held emergency meetings to work out a 
strategy to counter the seminars. Some seminars were at-
tended by as many as a dozen Indonesian diplomats in ad-
dition to the pro-Indonesian Timorese. 
Until now, seminars and conferences on East Timor and 
Indonesia which have been conducted for years in many 
parts of the world have been largely ignored by Indonesian 
diplomats, but it now appears that the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry and military intelligence realise that the regime's 
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Bais and their successors, Bakorstanas and BIA. Indo-
nesian security and intelligence forces penetrate down to 
the villages and neighbourhoods in the cities. People can be 
arrested at random a~d an atmosphere of fear is dominant. 
Enhancing ABRl's combat capacities 
President Suharto is supreme commander of ABRI. In 
pushin~ ba~k ABRI's du~I function role, he had to give 
something m return to satisfy the rank-and-file. Already in 
~he Benny Mu:d.ani days it was clear that ABRI was prom-
ised better trammg and modem equipment. General Mur-
dani had to tell his officers that the days when they could 
become corporate tycoons were over, but what he could 
deliver was a slim, professionalised ABRI. 
However, in contrast with neighbouring countries, 
ABRl's pr?fessionalism. is not very impressive. The Singa-
pore, Thai and Malaysian economies are in much better 
shape which is reflected in higher military expenditure. 
Another obstacle for ABRI is that the military industrial 
c~mplex is in the hands of Rudy Habibie, the powerful 
mm1ster for technology, leading to serious friction. 
Habibie's aspirations to design and build aircraft has liter-
ally empt.ie~ the state coffers, reducing ABRI's ability to 
buy soph1st1cated weaponry . The decision to buy 39 sec-
ond-hand East German. navy vessels enraged many at 
ABRI headquarters. It 1s becoming increasingly difficult 
for President Suharto to keep all parties happy. * 
reputation is taking a severe battering and have decided to 
monitor the meetings and spy on the Indonesians and East 
Timorese who take part. In some cases Indonesian diplo-
mats were even prepared to take their place on the panel of 
spe~kers. Dino Patti Djalal, Indonesia's star diplomat and 
the.1~ much-vaunted expert on East Timor, was so busy 
trailing the Nobel laureate that Ramos Horta said he felt 
like Jody Foster, being followed by a stalker. 
Indonesia's team concentrated on events in 1974 and 
1975 and the alleged human rights violations perpetrated 
by Fretilin after the brief civil war between UDT and 
~· retilin'. While coverage in the Indonesian press gives the 
1mpress1on that Jose Ramos Horta and his supporters were 
'cor~ered', the opposite is the case. Every attempt to dis-
cre?1~ the Nobel laureate got short shrift from the many 
act1v1sts present while audiences were angry at the constant 
heckling during question time. 
Jakarta's latest foray has only increased public aware-
ness about the true nature of the Suharto regime whose 
reputation as a pariah state is growing fast. One of the key 
issues raised during the seminars was how to take forward 
moves to imp?se economic sanctions against the regime. 
A~ the reputat10~ of Su?arto and his cohorts plummets, it 
will become easier to wm support in the US for the legiti-
mate aspirations of the people of East Timor. • 
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POLIDCAL TRIALS 
Dozens of political trials in progress 
The number of people being dragged before the courts is growing by the day. Two more PRD leaders 
face subversion charges, while many people are now on trial for daring to defY the government's 
threat against anyone advocating an election boycott. Leaders of PUDI have been arrested and 
charged with subversion, including former MP, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas. Labour leader Mochtar 
Pakpahan has had a particularly gruelling time in court and is now in hospital. 
Boycott the elections, 
Suharto must ~'lep down! 
Makar= rebellion. 
Greetings card brings subversion charge 
When former MP, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, sent a Le-
baran greetings card - marking the end of Ramadhan - to 
all his former colleagues in Parliament and a lot more· peo-
ple besides, he probably knew this would land him in trou-
ble. He had taken the novel step of including in the card the 
three-point programme of his party, the Partai Uni De-
mokrasi Indonesia, PUDI, set up last May. The three-point 
programme calls for an election boycott, rejects a seventh 
term for Suharto and calls for preparations for the post-
Suharto era. Inevitably hackles were roused. An invitation 
to lunch from an Attorney-general's official turned out to 
be the prelude to arrest, not only for him but also for two 
other party leaders, Julius Usman and Saleh Abdullah. 
They were all taken to the attorney-general's office. Sri-
Bintang was detained immediately and the others were 
taken into custody the next day. On 6 March, all three were 
charged with subversion. 
Bintang is no stranger to the courts. In 1996, he was 
tried and found guilty of insulting the head of state in a 
lecture he delivered while on a visit to Germany the year 
before. He was given a 34-month sentence against which 
he has appealed . He was not being held in detention, 
awaiting the outcome of the appeal but he was prevented 
from going abroad by a travel ban issued by the attorney-
general's office. 
Bintang's wife, Emalia, told the press that the issue of 
the Lebaran card had been known to the authorities for 
several months without anyone reacting. The decision to 
arrest and charge him came only after Suharto issued his 
order in late February for people using 'unconstitutional' 
means to unseat him to be 'clobbered'. (This is rich. coming 
from a man who seized power by the most violent means.) 
Emalia says she strongly supports her husband in all his 
political activities. When asked whether she agreed with 
some people who say he is 'too revolutionary', she replied: 
'That's nonsense. We've been ruled by him (Suharto) for 
thirty years. How long should someone go on ruling? .. . 
It's because he has ruled.for so long that collusion and cor-
ruption are so prevalent. And nothing's being done about 
it. We need an alternative. The people should be given an 
alternative. The people who chair the three parties should 
have the guts to nominate themselves for president. But 
they don't. Everyone's too afraid.' [Tempo Interaktif. l 5 
March, 02/02 edition] 
Sri-Bintang has shown himself to be a man of integrity 
and courage, determined to challenge the secrecy and def-
erence that strangulates political life in Indonesia. Orie of 
the first moves of his new party was to draw up a draft 
Constitution for Indonesia, reducing the powers of the 
president, enshrining democratic rights and allowing 
autonomy for the regions. In a regime where the 1945 Con-
stitution is sacrosanct, this is a bold move indeed. 
Interrogator uses violence 
As with all people arrested on charges of subversion, 
Sri-Bintang and his two colleagues are being held at the 
attorney-general's l\ead office in Jakarta. In cases of sub-
version, the attorney-general, not the police, are in charge 
of the investigations. 
A week after he was held, it became clear that Bintang 
was having great difficulty with the attorney interrogating 
him because of his insistence on knowing precisely what 
the charges would be. The clash led to Bintang demanding 
that the interrogator be changed. When the two men met n 
13 March, Silangit started beating Bintang when he refused 
to continue with the interrogation. As reported in Media 
Indonesia (19 March), Bintang said the interrogator used 
violence against him. Denying this, Silangit said: 'All I did 
was put my arm round him to get him to sit down.' 
12 T APOL Bulletin No. 140, April 1997 
Following this serious abuse, Bintang and the other two 
PUDI leaders have vowed not to answer any more ques-
tions until this dispute has be resolved. Meanwhile, on 18 
March several dozen young people demonstrated outside 
the location where the three men are being held, carrying 
posters calling for their release and for the repeal of the 
anti-subversion law. 
Mochtar Pakpahan, leader of the independent labour 
union, the SBSI, is now seriously ill in hospital with sus-
pected lung cancer. His trial has therefore been suspended. 
Although clearly ill at several court hearings, he was re-
fused proper medical treatment until after a strongly-
worded letter was sent to Attorney-General Singgih from 
Bill Jordan, General Secretary of the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions. Pakpahan has been the focus 
of many solidarity actions internationally. In Washington, 
the ICFTU General Secretary and John Sweeney, President 
of the AFL/CIO, led a protest rally to the Indonesian Em-
bassy in Washington calling for Pakpahan's release. 
Sweeney called 'MP' one of the most remarkable leaders 
of our time and said the demonstration in Washington was 
only the start of an international campaign which will con-
tinue until Indonesia 'stop(s) harassing and firing men and 
women for trying to organise unions free and indepeAdent 
of government control. We will not rest until they free 
MP.' [AFP, 7 February] 
Pakpahan's trial, as well as other subversion trials cur-
rently in progress, is being closely monitored by the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists, the ICFTU and the Inter-
national Bar Association. 
Presiding judge Djazali P. Sudibyo has been so ob-
structive and spiteful towards the defendant, his lawyers 
and sympathetic witnesses that the defence team filed a 
formal protest and called for his dismissal from the bench 
hearing the case. It was only after a number of complaints 
from the defendant about his det6riorating state of health 
that the judge agreed to write to the prison authorities to 
'pay attention to his medical needs> ~owever, the prison 
authorities said they needed authorisation from the judge. 
At the last hearing attended by Pakpahan before he became 
too ill to continue, the judge accused him of arriving late 
(his prison transport had been held up in a trafficjam~ as a 
stunt to draw attention to his health. After a heated argu-
ment with the judge who refused to act further on ensuring 
medical treatment, Pakpahan fainted and the session had to 
be adjourned. 
When one witness, Beria Fathia, withdrew statements 
contained in her interrogation report, saying that they had 
been made under 'stressful conditions', the judge accused 
her of perjury and ordered that she be held in a room under 
guard until she was willing to ·'reconsider' her statements 
in court. The judge also took the unprecedented step of 
ordering the details of a bank account held in ~akpahan:s 
name at a Dutch bank based in Jakarta to be disclosed m 
court. Funds of the SBSI have been impounded in the past 
in an attempt to cripple the union. As the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review [27 February] wrote: 'While bank records 
often serve as evidence in corruption and embezzlement 
trials, this is the first time that the state has pressed for such 
financial disclosure in a political .case.' 
The PRD trials 
In addition to the twelve PRO leaders and activists - eleven 
men and one woman - listed in our last issue as being on 
. OLITICAL TRIALS 
trial, two more have now been charged with subversion. 
They are Wilson and I Gusti Agung Anom Astika. Like 
their comrades who went on trial earlier, they have been 
accused of activities relating to setting up the People's 
Democratic Party, and for involvement in workers' and 
students' actions. 
Disputing the grounds for the .indictm~nt agai°;St. him 
and the legitimacy of the trial, W~lson sa~d the ~mister­
Coordinator for Political and Securtty Affairs, Soesllo Soe-
darman, had passed a political verdict against them on 2? 
July last year when he alleged that the PRD was respon~1-
ble for organising the riots in Jakarta on 27 July. (As. with 
the other PRD defendants, participation in the riots does 
not figure in the indictment.) Wilson told the court the PRD 
was trying to promote the people's aspirations.' Our gen-
eration was born on the golden bridge of the New Order 
and we know all about the abundance of wealth that has 
piled up on that bridge. But why is it that nothing has 
seeped down to those underneath? Although we are ready 
to accept imprisonment as the reward for what we have 
down till now, this trial will only intensify the pain felt by 
people who have already suffered so much and don't know 
the way out. We have done what we did in full conscious-
ness of the consequences, determined not to allow all these 
sufferings to fester on as social ills. ' [Kompas, 18 Febru-
ary] 
The trials of the nine PRO activists in Jakarta and three 
in Surabaya have recently been dominated by the issue of 
whether they should agree to testifying in each others' tri-
als as well as a number of walkouts by defendants as well 
as their lawyers. The walkouts occurred in protest against a 
court decision to allow statements made by witnesses dur-
ing their interrogations to be read in court, in the absence 
of the witness in question. Trial procedures allow this to 
happen in exceptional circumstances but no satisfactory 
explanations have been given for the absences. 
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As to whether they should testify in each others' trials, 
the matter was clarified in a letter from PRD president, 
Budiman Sudjatmiko, on trial in Jakarta, to Dita Indah Sari 
and her two colleagues who are on trial in Surabaya. He 
said that the prisoners in Jakarta had taken a collective de-
cision not to testify because of the principle of non-self-
incrimination, in line with the jurisprudence established by 
Supreme Court judge Adi Andojo during trials of a number 
of people charged in connection with the murder of labour 
activist, Marsinah (all those convicted later had their sen-
tences quashed by the Supreme Court), and to protect their 
civil rights. 
According to press reports, this came as a disappoint-
ment to Dita Sari and her lawyer who were hoping that her 
comrades would tell the court about their party. The lawyer 
argued that these were political cases and convictions were 
pre-determined, so why refuse to testify as this could only 
help to clarify things. However, the converse is also true: 
even if they agree to testify, the outcome of the trials will 
not be affected. 
In the event, there was major media coverage when 
Budiman, Ignatius Damianus Pranowo and Ken Budha 
Kusumandaru travelled to Surabaya under police escort. 
On their arrival in court, there was an emotional re-union 
between Dita Sari and Budiman but when he was sum-
moned to testify, he announced that he would not do so, 
adding that all statements made by him about his comrades 
had been withdrawn and should not be read out in court. 
When the court nevertheless allowed the statements by 
Pranowo and Ken Budha to be read out (Budiman's had 
not be given under oath), the two constantly shouted their 
disapproval. When Pranowo demonstrated his anger by 
turning his chair round and sitting with his back to the 
bench, he was removed from court for being disrespectful. 
Prosecution asks for 8 years for Dita 
In his summing up after witnesses had testified, the 
prosecutor asked the court to pass a sentence of eight years 
on Dita Sari and six years on Coen Pontoh. He claimed that 
the two were clearly shown to have been involved in ac-
tivities to undermine the state ideology. Their respective 
organisations, Dita Sari's trade union, the PPBI, and Coen 
Pontoh's peasant union, the STN, had become affiliated 
with the PRD led by Budiman Sudjatmiko which was bent 
on creating a coalition government that would be based on 
the principle of a people's democratic, multi-party democ-
racy. Furthermore, they had been involved in workers' 
struggles and had raised demands for freedom of associa-
tion, a minimum wage of Rp 7,000 a day, an end to mili-
tary interference in workers disputes and an end to the 
ABRI's dual function. 
!"le justified his lower sentence demand for Pontoh by 
saymg that he had not behave so badly as his co-defendant. 
Sentence is likely to be passed in mid or late April. 
Charged for printing AJI newsletter 
Suara Independen, the newsletter of the Independent 
Association of Journalists, AJI, has become a much sought-
after publication for printing news and reports other sec-
tions of the media do not dare to touch. In October last 
year, a printing press in Jakarta was raided and several 
thousand copies of the publication were confiscated. Two 
people were arrested, of whom one is now on trial. 
Andi Syahputra, 31, the manager of the printing house 
has been charged under Article 134 of the Criminal Code 
for deliberately insulting the head of state or his deputy, 
and could face up to six years. Jasrul Zen, in his sixties, 
an employee at the company, was released though some 
reports say he could still face charges and is under town 
arrest. The offending issue of the newsletter contained an 
article by Sri-Bintang challenging Suharto to agree to stand 
for presidential election in a direct vote, and not through 
the totally unrepresentative MPR, and another arguing that 
people no longer want to Suharto for president because the 
system over which he has ruled for more than thirty years 
has become authoritarian and heavily centralised. 
Meanwhile Tri Agus Siswomihardjo, one of three jour-
nalists who were tried and convicted in 1995 for editing 
publications critical of the government, was released from 
prison in March after serving his full two years. His co-
prisoners, Eko Maryadi and Ahmad Taufik, who were 
transferred from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta to a prison in 
Cirebon, apparently as a punishment, have again be moved, 
this time to separate prisons in West Java. 
Tri Agus Siswomihardjo released from prison 
Arrested for printing a book 
~?~badio Sastros~tomo, one of Indonesia's many elder 
poht1c1ans from parties that were active, or made inactive 
in the pre-Suharto era, is now secretary-general of the In~ 
donesian Socialist Party, the PSI. The PSI was banned by 
Sukarno in 1960 and never unbanned by Suharto. He re-
cently published a 20-page pamphlet entitled New Era, 
New Leadership: Badia Rejects the Machinations of the 
New Order. Within days of its appearance, the attorney-
general announced that the pamphlet has been banned. 
In March, the author was summoned for questioning by 
the Attorney-general's office as were several other well-
known critics of the Suharto regime, including Ali Sadikin 
a leading figure in the Petition-of-Fifty group, who was on~ 
of the first people to receive a copy. However, the choice 
for a scape~oat fell to a lesser known figure, the man who 
actually prmted the pamphlet. Book banning is nothing 
new. Hundreds of book have suffered the same fate in the 
continued on page 19 
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West Kalimantan conflict continues 
The ethnic conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese transmigrants has escalated in the last three 
months. The troubles started on 29 December last year but at the end of January new clashes spread 
the conflict to the entire region. By mid February the situation was out of control. Thousands of 
troops were flown in but were not able to cope. For a time, Dayaks were in control of the key inland 
highways. 
The unleashing of bitter inter-ethnic conflict in West 
Kalimantan is the result of decades of super-imposed de-
velopmental models that have failed to acknowledge the 
rights of local traditions, and failed to appreciate the re-
sulting deep-rooted sense of alienation among the native 
inhabitants. The intrusion by a large Madurese community 
into a region inhabited by Dayaks with their very distinc-
tive culture, produced a volatile mix of cultures that was 
bound, sooner or later, to explode. The racist, authoritarian 
regime centred on Java was incapable of recognising the 
trouble being stored up by an misguided transmigration 
programme. Both Dayaks and Madurese have suffered hor-
rendous losses as a result of this short-sighted policy. 
/. ,BRUNEI> 
MA L ~A y S .LA, '. 
In the conflagration of the past few months, thousands 
of homes, mostly belonging to Madurese transmigrants, 
have been destroyed. One month after the bitter conflict 
erupted in Sanggau Ledo [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 139, 
February 1997] the conflict flared again when forty 
Madurese youths attacked the Santo Fransiskus Asisi 
Catholic secondary school attended by Dayak children in 
the capital, Pontianak. Other buildings were attacked and 
two Dayak women were stabbed and had to be rushed to 
hospital. A day later, on 30 January, Madurese halted pub-
lic vehicles coming from Pontianak and started molesting 
Oayak passengers. These actions became more vicious the 
next day when in Peniraman some Dayaks were killed. 
This incident later became known as the Peniraman inci-
dent and was the start of a new stage in the conflict. 
An important Dayak Tumengung (traditional leader) 
named Nyungkat was killed . It was this death that further 
fuelled the flames of Dayak fury . News quickly spread that 
there had been many casualties on qoth sides, adding to the 
mutual recriminations. 
Heavy casualties 
The military have throughout been determined to hide 
the true extent of the conflict. They claim that 300 people 
died in the clashes. with the two communities suffering 
roughly the same number of casualties. Other sources are 
convinced that the figure is much higher. Non-
governmental organisations have made a tally of the num-
ber of victims in each of the districts in West Kalimantan 
and put the death toll at 1,720. The Muslim student organi-
sation PMII conducted an inquiry in February and con-
cluded that 1.200 people were missing. It has to be pre-
sumed that they conf~ned themselves to Madurese commu-
nities. The team visited several Madurese villages and 
based their conclusions on reports from villagers. Other 
sources put the death toll as high as 3,000. 
At least 19,000 Madurese have been displaced and it is 
not known how many Dayaks had to flee their homes. 
Journalists have been denied access to the interior but re-
lying on a variety of sources, they have been able to pro-
duced a somewhat clearer picture of the conflict. 
War situation 
The Economist reported on 15 February that "driving 
inland from the west coast of Kalimantan is like entering a 
war zone". The Bangkok daily Asia Times reported on 20 
February: "The burnings and killings continue. Despite 
repeated government announcements that the area is safe, 
the Dayak and Indonesian army roadblocks still stand. 
There is widespread fear that violence, even in Pontianak, 
can break out any time". 
In the third week of February several Dayak communi-
ties sent out the 'red cup' across the region, according to 
Dayak tradition, the sign of a declaration of war. They 
called for support from all Dayak communities in the three 
provinces ofKalimantan. The red cup is in fact white but is 
filled with human blood to symbolise war. 
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Anjungan and Sungei Kunyit atrocities 
There were many bloody incidents during the three 
months only some of which have been properly reported. 
The Anjungan tragedy started on 3 February when hun-
dreds of Dayaks attacked a military post at Anjungan. 
Many Madurese were taking refuge there. What seemed to 
be happening was that Madurese were being killed by 
Dayaks and Dayaks were being killed by the military. In 
one incident, 17 Dayaks were shot dead by troops. The 
corpses of Dayaks and Madurese were buried in a mass 
grave at Mandor. A day later Madurese homes wer_e set 
ablaze throughout the Pontianak subdistrict, in the villages 
of Sake, Salatiga, Mandor, Senakin, Pahauman, Darit and 
Ngabang. After large numbers of Madurese had been 
killed, Lt Colonel Untung Badja, the local military com-
mander ordered his men to shoot trouble-makers on sight. 
That afternoon, two truck-loads of Dayaks managed to 
break through a military road block at Anjungan. Troops 
punctured the tyres with their firearms and the trucks 
overturned. All the men on the trucks were shot dead in a 
volley of machine-gun fire . Their bodies were left to rot in 
the ricefields. An estimated one hundred Dayaks died in 
this atrocity. On 4 February an estimated 250 Madurese 
were killed in Salatiga, some of the corpses were discov-
ered in a cave. Another 450 Madurese died in Tayan, 200 
in Pahauman and another 100 in Ngabang. 
Some reports we have received are really too gruesome 
to reproduce. 
Another incident reported in the press occurred in the 
Sungai Kunyit area. On the evening of 17 February se.veral 
thousand ethnic Dayaks gathered in Toho, the nearest vil-
lage to Suak, a Madurese settlement. There were no troops 
in the vicinity to intervene in time. The next morning Suak 
was attacked by Dayaks armed with rifles, blow pipes and 
knives. When the military finally restored order, the entire 
village had been burned down and 17 people had been 
killed. More than a thousand Madurese had to flee from 
their houses. For the first time the army started rounding 
people up and 86 Dayaks and Madurese were arrested. 
Dayaks marginalised 
Several articles in the Indonesian press have highlighted 
the marginalisation of the Dayaks. Many foreign compa-
nies have been attracted by the fabulous profits to be made 
from exploiting Kalimantan's natural resources. Mining 
companies, logging companies, plantations, private and 
state companies have joined the rat race. Needless to say, 
such unbridled exploitation of the island's wealth h~ left 
the Dayaks on the sidelines. The labour force has been 
brought in from elsewhere while the informal business 
sector including small traders and public transport compa-
nies, are all in the hands of non-Dayaks. 
This marginalisation extends to the upper strata of the 
bureaucracy. Only one of the seven bupatis (district head) 
in West Kalimantan is an ethnic Dayak and he got the job 
only after the intervention of the present governor, Aspar 
Aswin, a retired major-general. Local customs used in the 
past for running community affairs have been ditched and 
replaced by the Indonesian way of doing things. What this 
has meant is the spread of the venal corruption, nepotism 
and favouritism that thrive in Jakarta. 
Already in the seventies, Dayak. communities we~e 
feeling the impact of racism and discrimination. Their 
longhouses were destroyed because, the bureaucrats ar-
gued, they were unhygienic and prom.oted improper sexual 
relations. The fact that the Dayak lifestyle had evolved 
over many centuries, with its own distinctive cultural and 
social values, was simply brushed aside. 
The Madura-Dayak conflict 
The Madurese, a migrant ethnic group from the islaf!d 
of Madura, off the north coast of East Java, are bearing the 
brunt of Dayak fury , fuelled not only by cultural differ-
ences but also by political and economic discontent. The 
position of the Madurese is not unlike that of the Dayaks, 
poor and marginalised. With few exceptions, Madurese are 
at the bottom of the economic ladder. They are known to 
be hard-working and take unskilled jobs in construction 
and road building. On the other hand, many Madurese are 
farmers which means that they live cheek by jowl with 
Dayak communities. 
As marginalised communities they have a lot in com-
mon but their conflicting roles and positions can put them 
on a collision course. The Madurese hold firmly to their 
own traditions, further intensified by the fact that they have 
been transplanted from their home base. Many Dayaks 
have been converted to Christianity in contrast with the 
Madurese who are very pious Muslims. The conflicts be-
tween the two ethnic groups is not new; in 1973, 1977 and 
1979 serious ethnic clashes erupted. Every time the 
authorities thought they could solve the problem by staging 
peace ceremonies involving local leaders whom the local 
administrators regard as people representing the different 
communities. They tried the same thing this time as well 
without having the slightest effect on what was happening 
on the ground. The roots of the problem, social, political, 
cultural and economic, remain untouched. 
Dayaks and Madurese to be charged 
According to independent reports, 164 people have 
been taken into custody and are likely to be tried on a 
number of charges. They include a group of Madurese to 
be charged with acts of violence at the start of the conflict, 
five Dayaks accused of acts of violence early in January, 
29 Dayaks accused of mounting an attack on an army bar-
racks in Anjungan on 4 February, a journalist working in 
the area for Kompas who is accused of circulating a chro-
nology about the Senggau Ledo incident, plus a large num-
ber of Madurese who are being charged with many acts of 
violence. 
Meanwhile, what may be fabricated documents alleging 
the existence of a movement for a Republik Dayak Mer-
deka or Free Dayak Republic, have been circulating widely 
in the region. Press reports in Jakarta suggest that seven 
Dayak community leaders could face subversion charges 
for alleged involvement in this movement. They include 
Stephanus Juweng, who heads the Institute of Dayakology 
in Pontianak, a body that has been researching the prob-
lems of indigenous people for several years, and S.M. 
Kaphat, a local MP who is also leader of the provincial 
branch of the PDI. All seven have denounced the allega-
tions as pure fantasy. • 
16 T APOL Bulletin No. 140, April 1997 
Wave of arrests in Aceh 
After a period of relative calm, Aceh is in the news again. Fourteen people have been arrested for 
alleged involvement in ~he Free Aceh Movement. The Indonesian military have confiscated a large 
number of weapons. They still regard Aceh as one of the main trouble spots in the archipelago. Aceh 
is closed to outside investigation; no independent human rights observers have been allowed in. 
Headlines like "GPK comeback?" in the Indonesian 
press suggest that considerable importance is being at-
tached to recent events in Aceh. GPK is the derogatory 
acronym used against all liberation struggles including the 
Free Aceh Movement or GAM. Even more significantly, 
the North Sumatra military commander, Major General 
Sedaryanto admitted in an interview with the Jakarta fort-
nightly, Forum Keadilan that 'the situation here is not yet 
stable'. 
Since 1989 ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces have 
been conducting continuous military operations in Aceh 
under the code name Operasi Jaring Merah (Operation 
Red Net). The operation has been renewed annually and 
Operasi Jaring Merah phase VII was concluded at the end 
of 1996. 
ABRI is now conducting a new wave of operations be-
cause of renewed activities apparently being undertaken by 
the Free Aceh Movement. The 1997 operation has been 
code-named Operasi Jaring Kikis, or Operation Network 
Extermination. 
Military operations 
On 26 February, Major General Sedaryanto told the 
press that his troops ·had staged an ambush in Panggoi 
Bawah Cunda village in the Lhokseumawe subdistrict. 
Other military operations were also conducted by a territo-
rial military intelligence squad backed up by Kopassus, the 
red beret special commando unit. The military operations 
began at the end of January and were still underway in 
mid-March. 
The operations were initiated in Kampung Peudawa 
Rayeuk, East Aceh where the army claims to have confis-
cated five AK47 semi-automatic rifles, other firearms and 
ammunition. Two people were arrested. ABRI also am-
bushed a house in Tanjung Balai which is located outside 
Aceh, in North Sumatra and arrested a fisherman, Mu-
hammad Daud Abubakar, who was allegedly operating as a 
courier for GAM 
Soon after, ABRI raided a house in the village of 
Lho'beuringin, subdistrict of Tanah Jambo Aye in North 
Aceh, confiscating more firearms. On 24 February ABRI 
claims to have ambushed a GAM headquarters near the 
village of Alue Bu Tuha, subdistrict of Peureulak in East 
Aceh. Nine people were arrested and yet more firearms and 
ammunition were seized. The following day a Kopassus 
unit attacked a house in Panggoi Lama, subdistrict of 
Muara Dua in North Aceh. Another 14 AK47s and Ml6 
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machine guns were found, along with hundreds of bullets. 
During these and subsequent operations, the army claims to 
have confiscated nearly two hundred firearms. 
(Readers should note that our information is based en-
tirely on reports in the Indonesian press which relies almost 
exclusively on military sources. No information from the 
Acehnese resistance has been forthcoming.) 
Grim situation 
Military operations have clearly reached a new pitch as 
the situation in Aceh has reverted to the grim conditions of 
the early nineties. Roadblocks have been set up along all 
the main roads, with security posts manned by the com-
bined forces of military, police and military-police, check-
ing up on the travelling public. People are required to show 
their identity cards and are subjected to body searches. 
Night patrols have been intensified in the villages. One 
person who travelled from Medan to Banda Aceh, a dis-
tance of 570 kms, went through at least four patrol posts. 
Public means of transport like buses suffer long delays as 
each passenger is questioned by troops. Along the eastern 
coastal route in Aceh the situation is even worse. Platoons 
continued on page 7 
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Judicial review on hold 
TAPOL, Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), and the World Development Movement (WDM) 
are considering their legal options after they failed to persuade the High Court to allow a review of 
the Government's decision to licence the export of water cannon and armoured vehicles to Indone-
sia. 
The decision of Mr Justice Laws in the High Court on 
25 March to dismiss the application made by T APOL, 
CAA T and WDM for leave to apply for judicial review 
stunned many of those present in the court packed with 
supporters of the three organisations. 
The organisations have the option of re-submitting their 
application to the Court of Appeal within ten days; at the 
time of writing, they are waiting for an eminent barrister to 
advise on their chances of success. 
Re-equipping ABRI for the elections 
On 9 December last year, just ten days after a National 
Audit Office report suggested that an aid project to train 
Indonesian police officers was used as a sweetener for arms 
sales [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 139, February 1997], the 
President of the Board of Trade, Ian Lang, announced that 
he had granted two licences for the export to Indonesia of 
50 armoured vehicles and a variety of police vehicles, in-
cluding seven Tactica water cannon. It was only after 
questions about these licences were asked in Parliament by 
Ann Clwyo MP that the Government was forced to reveal 
that the 'variety of police vehicles' included over 300 ar-
moured vehicles and that Britain is, therefore, involved in 
a major re-equipping of the Indonesian police force with a 
broad range of repressive and potentially lethal equipment. 
This equipment is likely to be used in the security measures 
being put in place for the Indonesian elections on 29 May. 
According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the 50 armoured 
vehicles are Scorpions made by Alvis of Coventry .. The 
licence for the water cannon and other police vehicles was 
issued to Procurement Sevices International Ltd., but the 
equipment is manufactured by Glover Webb of Hamble, 
Hampshire, a subsidiary of the GKN defence combine. 
The British Government has always claimed that it does 
not licence for export equipment which is likely to be used 
for internal repression in Indonesia or East Timor, and that 
Indonesia has given assurances that British-supplied 
equipment will not be used for repressive purposes. The 
Government also claims to take account of international 
guidelines agreed by the UN Security Council, the EU and 
the Europe-wide OSCE, which require exporters to have 
regard to the buyer country's human rights record and its 
record of compliance with its international obligations. 
One of the possible effects of the High Court judgment, 
as it stands, is that all these considerations will count for 
little or nothing if the Government makes a political deci-
sion that exports to a particular country should be allowed 
in view of 'overall foreign policy considerations'. In this 
case, the President of the Board of Trade has been able to 
grant the two licences in the face of considerable evidence 
that previously-exported armoured vehicles and water can-
non were used for internal repression in Indonesia. 
A British Tactica armoured vehicle patrolling in the streets of 
Jakarta. 
The Government was aware that in April of last year, 
British-made armoured vehicles were used in the violent 
assault on the university campus in Ujung Pandung, South 
Sulawesi, to stop students protesting against bus fare in-
creases. This armed attack against defenceless demon-
strators resulted in many injuries and three student deaths 
[see TAPOL Bulletin, No 135, June 1996]. The Govern-
ment has acknowledged that excessive force was used on 
that occasion to repress legitimate internal protest and that 
the use of the armoured vehicles was a breach of the assur-
ances given by the Indonesian Government. 
Forty days later various peaceful demonstrations were 
held to commemorate the deaths of the students who died 
at Ujung Pandung. One such demonstration, in Bandung, 
West Java, was forcefully broken up by the use of chemi-
cals sprayed on demonstrators from a British-made water 
cannon. T APOL obtained photographic evidence of the 
assault on the demonstrators and a statement by Agus Edi 
Santoso, the Chairperson of PIPHAM, the Centre for Hu-
man Rights, Information and Education, based in Jakarta. 
According to him: 
'During that action, the security forces led by BRIMOB 
{the Mobile Brigade is the shock force of the Indonesian 
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police] sprayed liquid from a British-manufactured ar-
moured vehicle which is called WWC. The water sprayed 
was not plain water; it was mixed With a chemical. People 
hit by the liquid felt faint and lost their balance (they felt 
like falling to the ground).' 
British water cannon were also deployed in Jakarta on 
27/28 July last year, during and after the police-led raid on 
the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party [see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 136, August 1996]. TAPOL obtained 
video evidence of water cannon (not British in this case) 
spraying a pink substance (probably water mixed with CS 
gas or dye) at civilians during that weekend. The Foreign 
Office Minister, Jeremy Hanley, stated quite categorically, 
in Parliament on 30 October 1996, that the use of water 
cannon against peaceful demonstrators and the use of 
chemicals or dyes with the water cannon is 'totally unac-
ceptable'. 
All the photographic and video evidence was supplied 
to the Government at the beginning of February. An ac-
companying letter from Stephen Grosz of Bindman & 
Partners, the solicitors acting for T APOL, CAA T and 
WDM, asked the Government to revoke the licences on the 
grounds that the decision to grant them was an 'irrational 
and unlawful' application of the Government's own clearly-
stated policy on arms exports. At no point has the Pov-
emment disputed any of the evidence submitted to it. 
Concern about the likely use of the British equipment 
heightened in February when Scorpion tanks were dis-
played before the Armed Forces (ABRI) Comn:iander in 
Chief, General Feisal Tanjung, as part of the equipment to 
be used by the security forces to 'safeguard' the 1997 elec-
tions. A few days later General Tanjung announced that 
ABRI would adopt an attitude of 'contained repression' and 
troops would 'shoot on sight' 'anyone who violates the 
law'. 
On 7 March, the Government wrote to Bindman & 
Partners to confirm that it would not revoke the licences. It 
contended that the de.cision to issue the licences was a 
matter for political judgment and that such decisions were 
affected by 'overall foreign policy considerations'. Mr Jus-
tice Laws effectively endorsed that approach in his judg-
ment on 25 March. He decided that the Government had 
looked at the allegations and concluded that they did not 
suffice to stop the licences. Furthermore, even if the refer-
ence to foreign policy considerations represented a shift in 
Government policy, that shift in policy did not provide 
T APOL, CAA T and WDM with a legal ground on which 
they could challenge the licenses. 
The three organisations are seeking a legal opinion on 
the exact meaning and effect of the judgment, but it may 
mean that even if a buyer country's human rights record is 
poor, and even if equipment is likely to be used for internal 
repression, foreign policy considerations could lead to the 
grant of a licence in any event. 
On receipt of further legal advice, the three organisa-
tions will assess their legal and campaigning options. An 
updated report will be included in the next TAPOL Bulle-
tin. • 
continued.from page 14 
past fow years. But what is new is to arrest and charge 
someone who was involved in having the publication 
printed. 
Buyung Rachmad Buchory was summoned for ques-
tioning by the Jakarta police on 20 March. He was then 
detained as a 'suspect'. Buyung has been closely associated 
with Subadio for a number of years; he was requested by 
the author to find a printing works that would print the 
pamphlet. The arrest warrant which became available after 
he was summoned is from January 1997 though without 
any mention of a date. It states that he is 'strongly sus-
pected of committing a crime by publishing a book that 
insults/discredits the Indonesian government and ABRI as 
stipulated under Article 137 (maximum penalty sixteen 
months) and Article 134 (maximum penalty six years) of 
the Criminal Code'. · * 
. EltM'TA 
In T APot BuUeliD Mo; ·Ill ddails about 1ltc new OditiOn ef ,_. 
I Dunn's: TIMOR:.4.P.,,_ _~~wniq.TheaeW .0. . 
· ubJisbcd by " ABC · Books.. Copies ·· • -· be obtaiMd hn .. p . . . . . . .· 
Austndia-East Timor ASIOCiadon (ASTA), P.O.Box 93~ Fitzroy, 
I Victoria 306S~ Australia. . Costs Allllt. $35 (post he wftbin 
Australia, plus po~ 1Q other countries) · . 
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UK academic course for ABRI scrapped 
A plan to hold annual education courses over a jive-year period for senior officers of the Indonesian 
armed forces by the Centre for Defence Studies which is part of Kings College, University of Lon-
don, was scrapped after academics and human rights groups strongly expressed their objections to 
the idea. 
The six-week course would have been held once a year 
in Indonesia commencing July 1997. The idea emerged 
following a visit to London last autumn by Major-General 
Prabowo, the son-in-law of President Suharto and com-
mander of the army's most battle-hardened unit, Kopassus. 
The idea most likely germinated during the hostage crisis 
in West Papua in 1996 when Prabowo was in command of 
the operation to free the hostages of whom four were Brit-
ish and was in daily contact with the British military at-
tache and other embassy officials. The British Government 
must have viewed this course as a way of 'repaying' 
Prabowo and his men for their services in rescuing the four 
Britons. 
For Prabowo, such a course would serve his own plans 
to produce what he regards as a more highly professional-
ised and well educated officer corps, in promotion of his 
aim to restore ABRI's position as a social and political 
forces in the Indonesian body politic. (See item on ABRI in 
this Bulletin.) 
CDS and the British Government 
The CDS is funded by the Ministry of Defence and 
functions as a think-tank as well as providing courses for 
armies in various countries, in broad compliance with 
British government foreign policy interests. Such courses 
provide the CDS with additional income for its staff; the 
Indonesian course would have been funded by the Indone-
sian Government. The course would also have involved the 
Centre for South East Asian Studies at the University of 
Hull and the Royal Military College of Science in Shriven-
ham. All communications between the British organisers 
and the Indonesian armed forces would have been chan-
nelled through the British defence attache in Jakarta, Colo-
nel Hellberg who also played a key part in negotiating the 
deal. 
A CDS letter addressed to MPs, journalists and NGOs 
stressed that its insistence 'that issues pertaining to human 
rights and humanitarian law be included on the curriculum 
had met with no resistance whatsoever'. 
Academics enraged 
Publicity about the course got off to a bad start with a 
report in The Guardian [ 5 March] stressing Indonesia's 
appalling human rights record and quoting Carmel 
Budiardjo of TAPOL as describing it as ' a neat arrange-
ment to give the Indonesian forces a human rights gloss'. 
She also called it a 'new example of the cosy arrangement 
between the British government and the Indonesian armed 
forces'. 
The very same day, academics at Kings were contacting 
T APOL to seek our reaction and saying that they had no 
idea that such a course was being organised by anyone at 
Kings until they read about it in The Guardian. It was im-
mediately decided to convene a public meeting on the 
campus at which T APOL, the Labour MP, Ann Clwyd, and 
Estevao Cabral, an East Timorese political exile living in 
the UK would speak. The meeting was convened by Pro-
fessor Keith Ewing of the Law School at Kings. Even 
though it had been called at very short notice, the meeting 
was very well attended. A member of the CDS Board, Pro-
fessor Lawrence Freedman, head of the Department of War 
Studies at Kings, sought to justify the course as a way of 
educating armed forces officers into a more open-minded 
approach to affairs in general and spoke of a better edu-
cated ABRI as being a 'force for change in Indonesia'. 
Meanwhile, other senior staff at Kings had expressed 
their concern that this ,link would bring the College into 
disrepute and students started collecting signatures to a 
petition opposing any links with the Indonesian armed 
forces. The weekly newspaper of the University of London 
Union lambasted the plan on its front page. In Parliament, 
in the week before parliament was dissolved, some forty 
MPs supported a motion calling for the course to be 
scrapped. 
Soon after the Kings protest meeting, Professor Freed-
land let it be known that he now realised that it would be 
very damaging to proceed with the course, for fear that it 
could 'tear Kings College apart'. By the time the CDS 
Board met a week later to consider what to do, it was clear 
that they would have to re-consider the whole idea. In a 
statement issued on 24 March, it was decided 'that it would 
be inappropriate for both educational and practical reCJ,Sons 
to proceed with the course in 1997 or in subsequent years 
under existing circumstances'. It also stated that, at a future 
meeting, it would discuss 'the criteria against which future 
proposals of this kind can be evaluated'. 
MA places for Indonesian officers 
Another plan, to grant ten places to ten Indonesian army 
officers to t~ke an MA one-year course at the Department 
of War Studies, was also restructured; instead of allowing 
ABRI to fill the places in a group, it will now be left to 
indi~idual officers to app!y ~or places and be accepted on 
men.t. I~ a letter to the Prmc1pal of Kings College, Carmel 
Bud1ar~JO of TAPOL described this programme as equally 
contentious. She asked whether the military careers of 
these _officers c.ould be ve~ed to discover whether any had 
~een •,nvolved ~n human nghts abuses or extrajudicial kill-
ings. The~e will be a number of persons in this country, 
ourselves included, who would be anxious to know who 
they are,' she wrote. • 
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Draft labour law criticised by NGO 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation - the YLBHI -
has blasted the government for its manpower bill which it 
said would subject workers to even worse conditions. than 
currently exist. Teten Masduki, for the Foundation, told 
Jakarta Post Tuesday [Jakarta Post, 26 December 1996] 
that the government-sponsored bill would legalise unfair 
labour practices, lessen workers' room to fight for their 
welfare, and could further enhance Indonesia's image as a 
source of cheap labour. 
'The bill serves to meet the state's economic and politi-
cal interests, using, as its justification, the need to face 
competition on the world market. 'The bill does not reflect 
the interests (of the workers),' Teten said. 
If passed into law, the bill would make it even more dif-
ficult for the government to protect workers' rights in 
times of free and harsh competition, he pointed out. 
The bill seeks to amend the 1969 Law No. 14 on Man-
power, which stipulates that the government has the 
authority to conduct 'labour inspections' and enforce the 
law. If passed, the bill will allow the government to inter-
fere in labour industrial disputes, without restraint. 
The bill is expected to pass into law before the general 
election in May. 
Many activists have criticised the bill for omitting pro-
visions on workers' right to associate and to assemble. 
They believe this would, directly or indirectly, leave work-
ers with no choice but to join the sole officially sanctioned 
All-Indonesia Workers Union Federation rather than estab-
lishing their own unions or join those that already exist. 
Lutfi Hakim, director of the legal aid division at the Ja-
karta chapter of the independent union, the SBSI - the In-
donesian Prosperous Workers' Union, said amending the 
law would be useless unless follow-up regulations are in-
troduced. 
The only point on which the government appears to 
have listened to NGOs is that it also covers workers in the 
informal section. Criticism of the existing laws includes 
lack of provisions on the protection of child workers, mi-
grant workers and indigenous people. 
Antara reported that only 68 of the 16, 73 7 companies 
which violated manpower regulations in 1996 have been 
taken to court. Director general for supervision of workers 
of the Ministry of Manpower, Suwarto, said that of the 68 
companies brought to court, 25 had been handed a verdict. 
Of these, five company owners were sentenced to impris-
onment and 20 were fined. [Jakarta Post, 26 December 
1996) 
Seminar on elections cancelled 
A one-day seminar on the need for free and fair elec-
tions was banned by the police who said that the organising 
committee had failed to notify the authorities of the event. 
Asmara Nababan, a member of the National Human Rights 
Commission, who was on the seminar organising commit-
tee, said that after discussions with the police, he had 
agreed to postpone the event for eight days. According to 
regulations, police must be informed of events at least one 
week ahead. 
~BIGHTS BRIEFS 
The seminar was convened by the International NGO 
Forum on Indonesian Development, INFID, the Catholic 
Students Association, PIJAR and the Indonesian Legal Aid 
and Human Rights Foundation, PHBI. The speakers were 
to have included Hadimulyo of the PPP, one of the three 
parties contesting the election, Mustahid Artari of GOL-
KAR, and Alex Litaay of the pro-Megawati POI which has 
been excluded from the elections. Other speakers were 
Mulyana W. Kusumah of the independent monitoring 
committee, KIPP, Marzuki Darusman of the National Hu-
man Rights Commission and political analyst, Arbi Sanit. 
PHBI spokesperson Paskah Irianto, criticising the po-
lice decision, said that 'permit politics' were being used to 
curb people's initiatives. 'It clearly contradicts freedom of 
expression and assembly guarante~d by the Constitution,' 
he said. [Jakarta Post, 14 March] 
Indonesian 'comfort women' cheated 
A total of 249 Indonesian women who were forced to 
work as sex slaves by Japanese troops during the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia have rejected a government plan to 
use $4 million offered in compensation by the Japanese 
government for the establishment of rest homes. They plan 
to sue the Japanese ambassador to Indonesia and the Indo-
nesian minister for social affairs if the plan is not cancelled 
and the money paid direct to the victims themselves. The. 
Japanese government wants to channel the cash to the In-
donesian ministry through the Asian Women's Club. 
Budi Hartono, the lawyer representing the women, said 
that a UN resolution in July 1996 requires the Japanese 
government to apologise to the women before paying any 
compensation and urged Tokyo to withhold the money un-
til the proper procedures have been followed. 
The 249 women involved are only a small fraction of 
the thousands of Indonesian women forced to become so-
called 'comfort women'. 'The Asian Women's Club should 
be dissolved because it's only a tool of the Japanese gov-
ernment's political engineering and has given misleading 
information about Japanese troops' atrocities,' said Budi. 
[Jakarta Post, 12 March] • 
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EASTTlMOR 
US seminars damage Jakarta's reputation 
At a time when the Suharto regime is becoming a major political issue in the US, the issue of East 
Timor was discussed at seminars in more than a dozen university campuses in the US and Canada. 
A bill in Congress to introduce military sanctions is gaining support while in Massachusetts, the 
state legislature is discussing trade sanctions against Indonesia. 
The bill in Congress being sponsored by Rep-
resentative Patrick Kennedy who visited East 
Timor last December is titled: the Indonesian 
Military Assistance Accountability Act. With the 
support of both Democrats and Republicans, it 
would make future military assistance to Indone-
sia conditional upon human rights performance. In 
the last fiscal year, the US provided $26 million in 
military assistance to the Indonesian armed forces, 
plus $600,000 for the military education and 
training programme, IMET. 
Meanwhile in Boston, the Massachusetts leg-
islature is considering a bill which would bar the 
state from doing business with companies which 
have ties with Indonesia, as well as divesting its 
pension funds of all Indonesian assets. A hearing 
on the bill was addressed by Nobel laureate Jose 
Ramos-Horta, while Jakarta sent three pro-
integration East Timorese to oppose the bill. The 
bill is sponsored by State Representative Antonio 
Cabral who said he had introduced the measure to 
protest at Indonesia's treatment of East Timor. 
Clinton on a referendum for Timor 
Soon after his election for a second term, Bill Clinton 
for the first time expressed an interest in the question of a 
referendum in East Timor. In a 27 December letter to 
Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, President Clinton 
wrote: 'I note with interest your support of a UN-sponsored 
self-determination referendum in East Timor. I will take 
your idea into consideration.' He also spoke favourably of 
using 'a combination of engagement and pressure' on Indo-
nesia. [JPS, 25 February] 
The Clinton Administration now appears to be ditching 
the sale to Indonesia of F-16 fighter jets which was sched-
uled to be announced in January, immediately after Clin-
ton's inauguration. Pressure to halt the sale has come from 
human rights groups and also because of the continuing 
scandal about Indonesian business donations to Clinton's 
election funding. According to the Wall Street Journal [25 
March], after a number of delays in announcing the deal, it 
now appears 'dead in any immediate time frame where it 
matters'. 
Seminars on East Timor and Indonesia 
It was against this background that more than a dozen 
seminars were held across the US in February and March 
around the theme, 'Self-Determination for East Timor, 
Democratisation in Indonesia'. 
Organised by the Foundation of Portuguese Universities 
in co-operation with universities in North America, they 
Seminar at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. From 
left to right:: Dino Patti Djalal, Liem Soei Liong, Antonio Barbedo 
Magelhaes, Geoffrey Robinson, Clementino do Amaral and Blshop 
Hilton Deakin. 
took place in such prestigious universities as Columbia, 
Harvard, Brown and the University of California in Los 
Angeles. The tour ended in Vancouver, with seminars at 
Simon Fraser University and the University of British Co-
lumbia. The seminars are the brainchild of Professor Anto-
nio Barbedo de Magelhaes, who first started holding semi.: 
nars on East Timor at Oporto University in the 1980s. The 
East Timor Action Network in the US and the East Timor 
Alert Network in Canada which both have chapters in 
many universities were also involved in organising the 
events. 
Among the East Timorese who participated were Nobel 
laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri 
and UDT leader Joao Carrascalao. US-based Timorese in-
cluded Constancio Pinto and Joao Mariano Saldanha while 
two Timorese from Dili were also present, Dr. Armindo 
Maia, the Vice-rector of the University of East Timor and 
Dr. Arlindo Marc;:al, former leader of the Protestant church 
in East Timor. Among the Indonesian activists invited to 
speak were Dr. Kastorius Sinaga, Sugeng Bahagyo, 
Helmy Fauzy and exiles Dr. George Aditjondro and Liem 
Soei .Liong. International guests included Bishop Hilton 
Deakm and Dr. Juan Federer from Australia and Dr. 
Monica Schlicher and Loyang Soenario from 'Germany. 
From Portugal came Madaleina Almeida Veiga and Pedro 
Pinto Leite. Academics from Portugal included Professor 
Luis Filipe Lobo Fernandes, Professor Maria Lourdes Bet-
tencourt Pires, Professor Vasco Garcia and Dr. Jose Az-
eredo Lopes. continued on page 11 
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EAST TIMOR'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE, 
Inside the Timorese Resistance, Constancio 
Pinto and Matthew Jardine, South End Press, 
Boston MA, 1997, ISBN 0-89608-541-4 
In the last few years, several excellent books have been 
written on East Timor but very few are by East Timorese 
themselves. This is what makes Constancio Pinto' s book so 
exceptional. lt stands out as a gem because it is the story of 
somebody who played a key role in tne East Timorese re-
sistance to the Indonesian occupation. Constancio Pinto 
embodies the gradual shift of the resistance from armed 
resistance to political resistance. He was born in 1963 
which makes him part of the transitional generation be-
tween the founders of the independence movement like 
Nicolau Lobato, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta 
and the present generation of East Timorese students who 
rally in the streets of Dili or climb over the walls of embas-
sies in Jakarta. 
Constancio Pinto is now studying at Brown University, 
Rhode Island and represents the CNRM, the umbrella of 
the resistance movement, in the US. He has frequently rep-
resented the views of the Timorese on the international 
arena. His wife Gabriela joined him in exile a few years 
ago. They have two children Tilson and Tima. I have had 
the good fortune of meeting Constancio at several interna-
tional gatherings. 
Having followed the situation in East Timor since t~e 
invasion in December 1975, I can say that Constancio 
Pinto's book confirms everything I know. But because it is 
a personal testimony, it was so gripping. that I c.ould not put 
it down and was filled with many emotions. It 1s a must for 
anyone wanting to know why the East .Timorese resistance 
is so effective despite the overwhelming presence of the 
occupation forces and the brutality used against the East 
Timorese. 
Take the third chapter which describes the period of en-
circlement and annihilation. Like most Timorese, Constan-
cio and his family had fled to the interior, still a libetated 
area. Life was relatively relaxed; there was plenty of food 
and Fretilin was well organised in the Remexio area, where 
he was staying. Constancio joined Falintil, th.e arme.d wing 
of the resistance, at the age of 14 for a bnef period but 
never personally experienced any skirmishes with ~ndo~e­
sian troops. However, in September 1977 the s1tuat1on 
changed dramatically. Saturation bombing bega~ and large 
numbers of Indonesian troops drove the population of East 
Timar into captivity. "Food shortages, diseases and kill-
ings were all around us. The Indonesian ~rmy wa~· atvi:ay~ 
hunting us. We didn't know how to c~pe with the sztuatzo~ 
[page 61]. It was little short of a miracle that c.onstanc10 
and his whole family (his parents and seven s1st~rs and 
brothers) survived. This chapter provides a ~ompellmg ac-
count of the terrible sufferings of the East T1morese people 
and why the Indonesians should abandon the place. 
Beginnings of the clandestine movement 
Subsequent chapters are about the author's life u~der 
Indonesian occupation. At first it was a story of survival 
but gradually, after Constancio joined the clandestine 
movement in 1983, the story reads like a thriller. Together 
with other East Timorese students like Donaciano Gomes 
and Jose Manuel Fernandes (both now in exile), he became 
part of a nucleo or cell which was in close c~ntact with 
Commandant David Alex, one of the key guemlla leaders 
in the armed resistance to this day. At first, the nucleo 
functioned mainly to give logistical support for the guer-
rillas but their tasks sooh became more elaborate. 
The year 1983 is a year to remember. Under the leader-
ship of Xanana Gusmao, the resistance emerged into the 
open and held its first ever negotiations with ABRI. There-
after the resistance took the shape of a trinity, the leader-
ship 'in the bush, the clandestine front and the diplomatic 
front abroad. By 1985 the clandestine front network w~ 
nationwide with branches even in Oecussi, the enclave m 
West Timor, and East Timorese students living in Indone-
sia also became part of the network. At first, clandestine 
activities were underground but in 1988 it was decided that 
actions were needed to win over public opinion. 
Suharto's visit to Dili in 1988, was a turning point. 
Faced with growing international criticism, Suharto wanted 
to show the outside world that Indonesia had nothing to 
hide in East Timor. A period of relative openness was 
launched. The visit of Pope John Paul to East Timar in 
October 1989 turned out to be a general rehearsal for the 
clandestine front's strategy to tell the world about the plight 
of the East Timorese. The clandestine front increasingly 
became a political front, showing open defiance to the In-
donesian forces of occupation. Actions taken by East 
Timorese youth helped to shape international public opin-
ion. Gradually East Timor became known to a wider public 
and the forgotten war was gradually transformed into the 
inspiration it now is in so many countries. 
Raising the stakes 
Then, Constancio and his comrades started taking more 
and more risks. After 28 May 1990, when the CNRM was 
established under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, the 
clandestine front was reorganised and Constancio, then 
only 27 years old, was elected secretary of the executive 
committee. In the meantime, actions continued. In June 
1990 during the visit of US Ambassador John Monjo, they 
launched another daring demonstration with pamphlets and 
banners which made the headlines. The visit by an Austra-
lian lawyer, Robert Domm, to the bush headquarters of 
Xanana, was largely due to the efforts of Constancio and 
his group. He remained a key leader of the urban resistance 
up to the demonstration of 12 November 1991 that led to 
the Santa Cruz bloodbath. His escape from East Timor and 
the problems that dogged him until his safe arrival in 
Macau, is one of the most gripping parts of the book. 
Working as a 'double agent' 
Like many key people in the clandestine front, Con-
stancio fell into the clutches of the military intelligence 
when he was arrested in January 1991. After being badly 
tortured, he decided to save his life by offering to work for 
the Indonesian intelligence. For a brief period he func-
tioned as a kind of double agent, promising to lead the 
army to Xanana's hideout, but soon the military realised 
that he was involved in preparing a demonstration on 12 
November at a time when most underground leaders were 
in detention. His most difficult problem was to conceal his 
connections with Xanana Gusmao, who was in hiding in 
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Dili. At one point Constancio was forced underground and 
named public enemy No 2 after Xanana Gusmao. 
The co-author Matthew Jardine has written a useful in-
troduction on the history of East Timor, the Indonesian 
occupation and the geopolitics of the US, along with an 
epilogue on recent developments and prospects in the in-
ternational arena. Nobel laureate Jose Ramos Horta has 
written the preface while Allan Nairn, US journalist, survi-
vor of the Santa Cruz massacre and a close friend of Con-
stancio Pinto, has written the foreword. 
This is not only a must for supporters of the East Timor 
solidarity movement but also for a wider public. Constan-
cio Pinto's story shows why it is that the East Timorese 
deserve the solidarity of anybody who cherishes peace and 
justice. 
Liem Saei Liang 
East Tbnor's Unjlnlshe.d Struggle by Constancio Pinto and 
Mllllhew Jardine can be ordered from ET AN/US P.O.Box 
1182, White Ploi/1$ NY 10602 USA, teL 911128 7299 or 
emaU d/111-tll@lgc.opc.org. USS 16.00, add 300,4,/or inter-
1 ttttlk11it11 ""1llall, 28% for surface maU. · 
Bitter Paradise, The Sell-out of East 
Timor, a film by Elaine Briere, Snapshot 
Productions, 1997. 
I had the good fortune to attend the premiere of Bitter 
Paradise in a packed hall in the heart of Vancouver, on the 
west coast of Canada. Elaine Briere received a standing 
ovation from the 700 people, which is truly well deserved. 
It is through Elaine's dedicated efforts over the years that 
the East Timor issue has become known to the average 
citizen in Canada. 
It took Elaine Briere about 7 years to produce this film. 
Lack of finances, bad health and other problems led to 
what must have seemed like insuperable barriers. But the 
end result is powerful. It sets out to show how Elaine 
Briere first stumbled across East Timor in early 1974, b~­
fore the upheavals in Lisbon which changed the country's 
history. During that chance visit, she took scores of stun-
ning black-and-white photographs which have since be-
come a familiar feature for East Timor campaigners around 
the world. After hearing of the invasion, her personal expe-
riences of the beautiful, peaceful country transformed her 
into a dedicated campaigner for the people she had grown 
to love. 
The 56-minute documentary portrays her deep affection 
for the people of East Timor and their culture and how the 
brutal invasion of Indonesia in 1975 changed everything. 
She focuses on the treacherous role of Canadian govern-
ments in ignoring the tragedy, preferring to promote Can-
ada's commercial ties with Indonesia. She interviewed a 
number of Canadian businessmen who expressed igno-
rance, saying bluntly that what happens in East Timor is 
not their concern. Every Canadian citizen as well as decent 
citizens in any country cannot but be touched by the film. 
She also focuses on the growth of the international solidar-
ity movement, giving credit to the many veteran activists 
around the world. 
Elaine Briere is a founder/member of ETAN, the rapidly 
expanding East Timor Alert Network in Canada. She has 
written articles, spoken to audiences and travelled widely 
in support of the East Timor cause. My first encounter with 
her was at the United Nations in New York and I'm proud 
to be one of her close friends. . 
Although she made this, her first film, with no previous 
experience in film-making, the documentary has been 
nominated for awards at three film festivals. Bitter Para-
dise is worthy of being shown around the world, not only 
in Canada, so I would urge readers to purchase the video 
and try to get a wider screening, in cinemas or on televi-
sion. 
Liem Saei Liang 
Bitter Paradise can be ordered through SNAPSHOT Pro-
ductions, 1657 East 55"' Avenue, Vancouver, BC V5P 1Z4 
As Home Video Can$26. 75 
Public Libraries Can$42.80 
NGOs/Unions/Citizen & Religious Groups Can.$107.00 
Colleges/Universities Can.$160.SO 
Mention PAL or NSTC version 
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